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INTRODUCTION
On March 17, 1994, the Fifth Inter-American Specialized
Conference on Private International Law of the General Assem-
bly of the Organization of American States' ("O.A.S.") adopted
1. See CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Apr. 30, 1948, T.S. No.
1-D, OEA/Ser.A/2 (English) Rev. 2 [hereinafter 'OAS CHARTER]. Protocol to amend
the OAS Charter "Protocol of Buenos Aires", February 27, 1967. Id. Protocol to amend
OAS Charter "Protocol of Cartegena de Indias," December 5, 1985. Id.
As specified in its Charter, the OAS has the following essential purposes: to
strengthen the peace and security of the Hemisphere; to prevent possible
causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may
arise among the member states; to provide for common action on the part of
those states in the event of aggression; to seek the solution of political, juridi-
cal, and economic problems that may arise among them; and to promote, by
cooperative action, their economic, social and cultural development.
OAS CHARTER, (editorial statement at endleaf).The Organization of American States ("OAS") is the oldest regional organization
of states in the world, dating back to the First International Conference of American
States held in Washington, D.C. in 1890. Id. From the perspective of the United Na-
tions, the OAS is considered a regional agency. See U.N. CHARTER art. 56 (providing
coordination between United Nations and regional organizations); see also IAN BROWN-
LIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 692-94 (3d ed. 1979) (discussing rela-
tions between international organizations). The 32 members of the OAS are: Antigua
and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
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the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to Inter-
national Contracts ("ICLAIC") .2 The ICLAIC represents an ef-
fort to continue the development and codification of private in-
ternational contract law. The ICLAIC aims to establish uniform
choice-of-law4 rules for contractual obligations for the O.A.S.
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Gua-
temala, Haiti, Honduras,Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and To-
bago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. OAS CHARTER art. A-41.
The United States ratified the OAS Charter with the reservation
that none of [the Charter's] provisions shall be considered as enlarging the
powers of the Federal Government of the United States or limiting the powers
of the several states of the Federal Union with respect to any matters recog-
nized under the Constitution as being within the reserved powers of the sev-
eral states.
Id. at A-41/3. The United States signed the Protocol of Cartegena des Indias, amend-
ing OAS Charter on November 7, 1986. Id. at A-50. The Protocol establishes nonbind-
ing goals, including the goal of reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers to
exports of all member states. Id. atA-50/4. The Protocol is effective with respect to the
United States only insofar as its provisions are interpreted and applied in a manner
consistent with such actions in furtherance of democracy, social justice, human rights
and assistance to the poor. Id. at A-50/3. Its provisions do not derogate in any way
from the obligation of states to faithfully fulfill their international obligations with re-
spect to transnational enterprises whether derived from treaties and agreements or
other sources of international law. Id. at A-50/3-4. The Protocol does not affect the
competence or scope of the General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), as
the principal rulemaking body for the international, trading system, to address negotia-
ble issues such as special and differential treatment for developing country exports. Id.
at A-50/4.
2. Organization of American States Fifth Inter-American Specialized Conference
on Private International Law: Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to
International Contracts, March 17, 1994, OEA/Ser.K/XXI.5, CIDIP-V/doc.34/94 rev. 3
corr. 2, March 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 732 [hereinafter ICIAIC]. Four states adopted
ICLAIC: Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id.
3. The ICLAIC, supra note 2, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 732-33. "The States Parties to this
Convention, [r]eaffirming their desire to continue the progressive development and
codification of private international law among member States of the Organization of
American States ... [h]ave [a]greed to approve this Convention." Id.
[P]rivate international law is part of the domestic law of the forum. Thus each
court applies its own choice-of-law rules - the rules of private international
law of the legal system of the State under whose jurisdiction the court sits.
[P]rivate international law changes from State to State, from forum to forum,
just as the rest of substantive law varies from State to State. That variation of
substantive law is... itself the justification for the existence of private interna-
tional law.
Aubrey L. Diamond, Harmonization of National Law, in 4 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL RECUEIL DES COURS COLLECrED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 233, 241 (1986).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 186-188 (Supp. 1988) (pro-
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community.5 The ICLAIC will generate a great deal of contro-
viding general approach to be followed in determining choice-of-law questions involv-
ing contracts). These sections provide:
§ 186. Applicable Law
Issues in contract are determined by the law chosen by the parties in accord-
ance with the rule of § 187 and otherwise by the law selected in accordance
with the rule of § 188.
§ 187. Law of the State Chosen by the Parties
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties
could have resolved by an explicit provisions in their agreement directed to
that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the
parties courd not have resolved by an explicit provisions in their agreement
directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fun-
damental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the cho-
sen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the
rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is
to the local law of the state of the chosen law.
§ 188. Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in con-
tract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that
issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties
under the principles...
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187),
the contracts to be taken into account in applying the principles.. .to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance
are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLIcr OF LAWS §§ 186-188 (Supp. 1988).
5. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 733. "This Convention shall determine
the law applicable to international contracts." Id. The ICLAIC, in some respects, paral-
lels the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations for the European
Community ("EC"), commonly known as the 1980 Rome Convention. Convention on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 19June 1980; 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2
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versy as each of the thirty-two O.A.S. Members, including the
United States,6 determines whether to ratify the ICLAIC as
adopted by the O.A.S.7
Debate regarding the possible U.S. adoption of an interna-
tional agreement focusses on resolving four primary areas of
concern:8 the general necessity and desirability of the agree-
ment;9 the effect of the agreement on international1" and U.S.
domestic law;11 the impact on the international commercial
community;1" and the effectiveness of the agreement in imple-
menting international rules.' Although significant investigation
has been devoted to the unification or harmonization of the
choice-of-law principles applicable to contracts,' 4 the success of
the ICLAIC in terms of its adoption by the United States remains
(Cm. 1794), O.J. L 266/1 (1980) (hereinafter Rome Convention]. The Rome Conven-
tion provides uniform conflict of laws rules for contractual obligations. Id. The Rome
Convention entered into force April 1, 1991. Id. This Convention governs conflict of
laws rules in: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, and the United Kingdom. Id. See H. Matthew Horlacher, The Rome Convention
and the German Paradigm: Forecasting the Demise of the European Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 173, 183-93 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Paradigm] (discussing inconsistencies and deficiencies of Rome Convention).
6. OAS CHARTER, art. A-41 (indicating United States as OAS. member).
7. OAS CHARTER.
8. Cf JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 57-76 (1987) [hereinafter UNIFORM LAw] (discussing ar-
eas of concern in adoption of international agreements).
9. Cf. id. (discussing special significance of new convention).
10. Cf. id. at 57 (discussing limits of new convention and international transac-
tions).
11. Cf. id. at 58-59 (discussing new convention as model for improving U.S. domes-
tic law).
12. Cf. id. at 57-58 (discussing international use of legal ideas as illustrated by wide-
spread acceptance of new convention).
13. JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLLAMJ. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS; CASES, MATERIAL AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 252 (2d ed. 1986).
One of the most perplexing aspects of international law .... is the question of
"effectiveness." There is often a tendency, particularly on the part of persons
(official or otherwise) who have not had direct experience with international
matters, to discount the impact of international rules. This is probably at least
partly because that impact sometimes differs substantially from the impact of
domestic law rules, and because it is often difficult to understand the more
subtle impact of international rules.
Id.
14. Peter Winship, Private International Law and the U.N. Sales Convention, 21 COR-
NELL INT'L LJ. 487, 487-88 (1988) [hereinafter Winship 1].
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in doubt.' 5
This Note argues that the United States should not adopt
the ICLAIC in its present form because doing so will compro-
mise the existing U.S. framework for U.S. contract law. 16 Part I
discusses the current legal framework of contracts for the sale of
goods in the United States, including: the major provisions of
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods 17 ("C.I.S.G.") and Article 2 of the Uniform
15. Diamond, supra note 3, at 308.
One stage further down the road from the unification of contract or sales law
is the unification or harmonization of the principles of private international
law relating to contracts. As we have seen, much work has gone into this,
although the success of the various conventions in terms of adoption of con-
ventions is still largely in doubt.
Id. Professor Diamond argues that managing private international law relating to con-
tracts is unlikely, but there is a current trend towards similarity of results among the
different jurisdictions that justifies the attempt to make uniform rules. Id.
16. The ICLAIC, supra note 2, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 733. The unification rational is
expressly stated:
The States Parties to [the ICLAIC] ... [r]easser[t] the advisability of harmo-
nizing solutions to international trade issues [and] ... [b]ear in mind that the
economic interdependence of States has fostered regional integration and
that in order to stimulate the process it is necessary to facilitate international
contracts by removing differences in the legal framework for them.
Id.
17. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
opened for signature April 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex 1, 19 I.L.M. 668
[hereinafter C.I.S.G.]. The C.I.S.G. is designed to establish uniform law for interna-
tional sales. JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL SALES 1 (1989) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. C.I.S.G. is also
known as the Vienna Convention, which is the governing law for most exports and
imports of goods. E. Allan Farnsworth, Review of Standard Forms or Terms Under the Vienna
Convention, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 439, 439 (1988). C.I.S.G.'s goal is to "free interna-
tional commerce from a [b]abel of diverse domestic legal systems." DOCUMENTARY HIs-
TORY, supra, at 1. The C.I.S.G. is law in those jurisdictions that deposited instruments of
adoption with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, subject to the waiting pe-
riod specified in Art. 99 (1) and a similar period for subsequent adoptions in Article
99(2). C.I.S.G., supra, art. 99, 19 I.L.M. at 694. The United States is one of the initial 11
signatories to the C.I.S.G. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 1 n.1 (providing compila-
tion of documents contributing to C.I.S.G.'s ultimate goal of uniform "application" of
uniform rules).
Through February, 1994, the C.I.S.G. has been ratified and entered into force
in: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Can-
ada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland,
France, Guinea, the German Democratic Republic [sic], the Federal Republic
of Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Lesotho, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway,
Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine, United States of America, Yugoslavia, and
Zambia. See U.N.DocA/CN.9/304. In the United States, the C.I.S.G. is consid-
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Commercial Code ("U.C.C.").1 Part I also introduces the provi-
sions of the recently concluded ICLAIC. Part II discusses the
three principal objectives of the ICLAIC by analyzing its Pream-
ble and illustrating the provisions intended to accomplish these
goals. Part III recognizes the theoretical benefits offered by the
ICLAIC, but argues that these are outweighed by the many costs
associated with U.S. adoption. This Note concludes that the
ICLAIC would create numerous choice-of-law standards rather
than achieve a uniform choice-of-law standard and, therefore,
should not be adopted.
I. CURRENT U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE SALE OF GOODS
In the United States, harmonization efforts have liberalized
the rules of contract formation in the commercial context
through the adoption of the U.C.C.19 specifically, Article 2 of the
U.C.C., which applies to transactions in goods.2" In 1988, the
rules of international contract formation were harmonized in
ered a self-executing treaty, so no domestic, federal legislation was enacted, or
is necessary. Courts may apply the Convention directly to the issues raised by
individual litigants who are parties to international sales contracts covered by
Article 1.
SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 1383 (1994 West Publishing Co.).
18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1990 Official Text) [hereinafter U.C.C.]. Unless
otherwise indicated, all references to the U.C.C. in this Note are to the 1990 Official
Text. Id. The Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") is a commercial "[c]ode 'de-
rive [d] from the common law' and 'assumes the continuing existence of a large body of
pre-Code and non-Code law on which it rests for support.' Much of the pre-Code and
non-Code law is case law from such fields as contracts, agency and property." JAMESJ.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 7 (2d ed. 1980); 1 U.L.A. 1
n.1 (Master ed. 1976) (listing jurisdictions and enacting dates of the U.C.C.). The
U.C.C. is law in jurisdictions by virtue of local, jurisdiction by jurisdiction, enactment.
Id. at 1. The U.S. Congress has not enacted the U.C.C. as general federal statutory law.
Id. Federal commercial law overrides the U.C.C. Id. at 7; see SELECTIONS FOR CON-
TRACTS 1-6 (E. Allan Farnsworth & William F. Young eds., 1992) [hereinafter FARNS-
WORTH & YOUNG] (discussing background and application of U.C.C.); see generally
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra, (outlining basic content of U.C.C. and analyzing growing case
law); QUINN'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST (1991 & 1994
Cum. Supp. No. 2) [hereinafter QUINN'S DIGEST] (providing explanations of U.C.C.
principles and concepts).
19. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing U.C.C. within U.S. legal
system).
20. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990). This provision states that:
Unless the context otherwise requires, [Article 2] applies to transactions in
goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an
unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a
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the United States by the C.I.S.G. 2 1 As a treaty ratified by the
United States, the C.I.S.G. is the supreme law of the United
States and prevails over conflicting state law. 2 At the time of
ratification, 3 the United States declared that it would join the
C.I.S.G. with reservations. 4
security transaction nor does this Article impair or repeal any statute regulat-
ing sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers.
Id.; see Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing scope of Article
2 in terms of whether "predominant factor" of contract is goods or services).
21. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing conclusion of C.I.S.G. and
self-executing effect in United States). See President's Message, 22 I.L.M. 1368 (discuss-
ing similarity of C.I.S.G.'s rules, which unify law of international sales, to U.C.C., which
unifies laws for domestic sales); see generally UNIFORM LAW, supra note 8, at 57-71 (intro-
ducing C.I.S.G. and its application); Peter Winship, Congress and the 1980 International
Sales Convention, 16 GA.J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 707 (1986) [hereinafter Winship 2] (analyz-
ing congressional role in negotiation of C.I.S.G.); John E. Murray, Jr., An Essay on the
Formation of Contracts and Related Matters Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, 8J.L. & COM. 11 (1988) (discussing contract formation
under C.I.S.G.); Maureen T. Murphy, Note, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Creating Uniformity in International Sales Law, 12 FoRDHAM
INT'L L.J. 727 (1989) (discussing unifying effects of C.I.S.G. on international contract
law); Symposium, The Codification of International Commercial Law: Toward a New Law
Merchant, 15 BROOK J. INT'L L. 1 (1989) (discussing various aspects of application of
C.I.S.G.). For a current assessment of the role of the C.I.S.G. in international commer-
cial contract law, see generally Kenneth C. Randall &John E. Norris, A New Paradigm for
International Business Transactions, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 599 (1993).
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties"); id. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2 ("[A]II Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land").
Congressional power to modify the C.I.S.G. by subsequent legislation already exists
as a matter of domestic constitutional law. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 135(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1, -1980). Exercise of
this power, however, would be violative of the international obligation undertaken by
ratification. Winship 2, supra note 21, at 723. Subsequent domestic legislation super-
sedes earlier treaties when the Congressional purpose is clearly expressed or when the
act and earlier provision cannot be reconciled. Id. at 723.
23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. ratification of
C.I.S.G.). The C.I.S.G., adopted at a diplomatic conference convened in Vienna in
1980, was implemented with unprecedented speed. John Honnold, Introduction to the
Symposium, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 419, 419 (1988) [hereinafter Introduction to the Sympo-
sium]. On October 9, 1986, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratifica-
tion of the C.I.S.G. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,773-74 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The official text
of the C.I.S.G appears in Annex I of the Final Act of the 1980 conference. U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.97/18 (1980). The English text is reprinted in S. TREATv Doc. No. 9, 98th
Conf., 1st Sess. 22-43 (1983).
24. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, at 384.
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A. The C.I.S.G. and the U.C.C.
The C.I.S.G. generally applies to sales contracts between
parties located in different contracting states.215 Article 2 of the
U.C.C. limits the U.C.C.'s scope to any contract for the sale of
goods,26 without any explicit reference to the location of the par-
ties to the contract.27 Because the C.I.S.G. applies only to inter-
national sales contracts, 28 and the U.C.C. applies domestically,
these two bodies of law coexist.2 9
1. The C.I.S.G.
The C.I.S.G. and the U.C.C. are not complete and exclusive sets
of rules, however,30 and thus both provide displacement and
25. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 1(1)(a), 19 I.L.M at 672.
26. U.C.C. § 2-102.
27. See id. § 1-105(1) (discussing territorial application of U.C.C. and parties'
power to choose applicable law, including conflict-of-laws rules).
28. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 1, 19 I.L.M. at 672. Article 1 provides, in part, that:
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties
whose places of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the
law of a Contracting State.
Id.
29. See Peter Winship, Domesticating International Commercial Law: Revising U.C.C.
Article 2 in Light of the United Nations Saleks Convention, 37 Loy. L. REv. 43, 43 (1991)
[hereinafter Winship 3] (discussing spheres of application of two laws). "The two laws
coexist comfortably because the Convention applies only to 'international' sales con-
tracts and there will therefore be little overlap between the sphere of application of the
two laws." Id. See Farnsworth, supra note 17, 439-42 (analyzing hierarchy of domestic
law and the C.I.S.G.); Winship 1, supra note 14, at 518-30 (exploring interplay between
C.I.S.G. and rules of private international law, "conflict of laws").
30. Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROITPrinciples of International Commercial Contracts: The
Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FOUrDHAM L. REv. 281, 292 (1994). In the interpreta-
tion of contracts and statements, the C.I.S.G. and the U.C.C. take into account the
parties course of dealing, course of performance, usages, and relevant circumstances.
Id. at 295. C.I.S.G. Article 7(2) relies on general principles of international law and
practices to settle issues not expressly addressed. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 7(2), 19
I.L.M. at 673. Article 7(2) provides that:
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not ex-
pressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles
on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with
the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
Id. Similarly, U.C.C. Article 1-102 permits interpretation and continued expansion of
commercial practices through custom and usage. U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (b).
Separate from the interpretation process, both the C.I.S.G. and the U.C.C. permit
freedom of contract by agreement of the parties. Article 6 of the C.I.S.G. expressly
permits the courts to review practices that the parties have established between them-
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gap-filling of contract terms.3 1 The C.I.S.G. does not, however,
defer to the U.C.C. on issues of formation and the obligations
and liabilities concerning the sale of goods."2 The C.I.S.G. and
selves. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 6, 19 I.L.M. at 673. The parties to a contract, subject
to the Convention's rules, may agree to vary any particular provision of the Convention.
Id. "The parties may exclude the application [of the C.I.S.G. by agreement] or ...
[contracting states may make a declaration at the time of deposit of its instrument of
ratification] to derogate from or vary the effect of any of [the C.I.S.G.] provisions." Id.
Article 9 of the C.I.S.G. addresses preliminary negotiations between parties. Id. art. 9,
19 I.L.M. at 674. Article 9 provides:
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any
practices which they have established between themselves.
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly
made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties
knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely
known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved
in the particular trade concerned.
Id.
U.C.C. § 1-102(3) also takes into account the preliminary negotiations between
parties. U.C.C. § 1-102(3). Section 1-102(3) states that the code "may be varied by
agreement, except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and
care may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine
the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such
standards are not manifestly unreasonable." Id.
31. Winship 3, supra note 29, at 50. Gap-filling and displacement is a feature of
both the U.C.C. and C.I.S.G. See id. at 47 (reviewing relationship between U.C.C and
C.I.S.G. and suggesting analysis and codification by U.C.C sponsors). Consequently,
U.C.C. § 1-205 supplies terms that are not set out expressly in the contract. U.C.C. § 1-
205. See QUINN'S DIGEST, supra note 18, at 81-90 (discussing usage of trade background
to resolve any ambiguity in agreement). U.C.C. § 2-328, and §§ 2-304 to -320, supply
general terms, quality terms, and technical terms when an open terms problems arise
involving- price (§§ 2-304 to -305), quantity (§ 2-306), delivery (§§ 2-307 to -308), ab-
sence of time for payment (§ 2-309) or delivery (§ 2-310), or particulars of performance
(2-311). U.C.C. §§ 2-304 to -320, § 2-328. The U.C.C. recognizes that a court may find
a contract or any clause to be, as a matter of law, unconscionable. U.C.C. § 2-302.
Though such a finding may restrain the freedom of contract, a court will nullify the
clause or the contract. See QuiNN's DIGEsr, supra note 18, at 158-71 (discussing uncon-
scionability provision as maintaining freedom of contract and balance of power); see
supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing C.I.S.G.'s noncomprehensive nature,
providing freedom of contract provisions and use of observed trade practices imputed
in the contract). See also, Burt A. Leete, Contract Formation Under the United Nations Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of, Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Pitfalls for the Unwary, 6 TEMp. IrNr'L & CoMP. L.J. 193, 194-95, 215 (1992) (suggesting
that while C.I.S.G. and U.C.C. utilize different approaches they should be viewed as
useful tools in negotiation of international contracts). See generally Winship 1, supra note
14, at 493 (discussing gap-filling role of choice-of-law rules).
32. See C.I.S.G., supra note 17, 19 I.L.M. at 674-92 (providing provisions on forma-
tion of contract and obligations of parties). The United States reservation under Arti-
cle 95 does not preserve the U.C.C.'s formal requirements in domestic law. Id. at 385.
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the U.C.C. differ as to application, 33 formation, 4 warranty, 35 and
33. See James C. Bruno & Jeffery M. Brinza, CISG's New Year's Day Triumph over
UC.C., 66 MicH. Bus. L.J. 1206, 1206 (1987) [hereinafter Triumph] (discussing major
differences between C.I.S.G. and U.C.C. as to application). Regarding the issue of ap-
plication, Bruno and Brinza state that:
CISG's coverage is narrower than the U.C.C.'s. The CISG does not apply to
sales of goods purchased for personal, family, or household use (this excludes
substantially all consumer purchases), sales by auction, sales on execution or
otherwise by authority of law, or sales of ships, vessels, hovercraft, or aircraft.
The U.C.C. states that, "unless the context otherwise requires, this article ap-
plies to transactions in goods. .... ." Under the U.C.C., "'[g]oods' means all
things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the
time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which
the price is to be paid, investment securities and things in action." The CISG's
scope is further limited because it does not apply to sellers' liability for death
or injury caused by goods sold. Instead, local rules governing products liability
are retained.
Id. at 1206.
34. See id. (discussing principal differences between C.I.S.G. and U.C.C. as to for-
mation). Regarding the issue of formation, Bruno and Brinza state that:
Contracts formed under the CISG are governed primarily by Article 11, which
stipulates, "A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writ-
ing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved
by any means, including witnesses." The CISG essentially does away with the
U.C.C. statute of frauds provision for sale of goods of $500 or more. This
rejection of the formal requirements of the statute of frauds does not prevent
the parties from imposing their own specific writing requirements. For exam-
ple, an offeror may require a written acceptance, just as either party could
require a written modification or termination. The key provision regarding
the legal effect the CISG gives to practices of the parties and to commercial
usage is discussed in Article 9. Like the U.C.C. course of dealing provision,
Article 9 states that parties are bound by the practices established between
themselves. Furthermore, "[t]he parties are considered, unless otherwise
agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a
usage of which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in interna-
tional trade is widely known. . . ." Although both the U.C.C. and the CISG
recognize "usage of trade," the CISG appears to give it more importance. The
CISG focuses on more detailed requirements governing the formation of a
contract than the U.C.C. In particular, an offer must indicate the goods and
expressly or implicitly fix or make provision for determining the quantity and
the price. The CISG also asserts that an offer becomes effective only when it
reaches the offeree, and may be withdrawn or revoked at any time before the
offeree has dispatched an acceptance unless, by its terms, it is irrevocable or
the offeree has reasonably relied on the offer as being irrevocable. Further-
more, any statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent
to an offer is an acceptance. An acceptance of an offer generally becomes
effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror. An impor-
tant contract formation provision is CISG Article 19 which addresses the prob-
lem caused by a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance, but
contains a modification of the offer. Under Article 19, 'a reply to an offer
which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or
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other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer."
If the modifications in the reply "do not materially alter the terms of the offer,
then the reply to the offer is an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue
delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches notice to that effect."
Examples considered to materially alter the terms of an offer include addi-
tional or different terms relating to the price, payment, quality and quantity of
goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one party's liability to the other or
the settlement of disputes. The CISG's approach to the problem of contract
modification differs from that of the U.C.C. The U.C.C. states that a material
alteration or modification may not prevent the "altered reply" from forming a
contract. It provides a definite and reasonable expression of acceptance, sent
within a reasonable time, operates as an acceptance even though it contains
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon. Addi-
tional terms are considered proposals for addition to the contract. If both
parties are merchants, then the additional terms become part of the contract,
unless "the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer," the
additional terms "materially alter it," or the "notification of objection has al-
ready been given or is given within a reasonable time."
Id. at 1206-07.
35. See id. (discussing major differences between C.I.S.G. and U.C.C. as to war-
ranty). Regarding the issue of warranty, Bruno and Brinza state that:
Differences between the warranty provisions in the CISG and the U.C.C. is
another area of significance. Essentially, CISG Article 35, like the U.C.C., pro-
vides the buyer with his basic expectations of quality. Article 35 contends that
the seller must supply goods of the quantity, quality, and description provided
in the contract and that:
Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not con-
form with the contract unless they:
(a) Are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description
would ordinarily be used;
(b) Are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known
to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for
him to rely, on the seller's skill and judgment;
(c) Possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the
buyer as a sample or model;
(d) Are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or,
where there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect
the goods.
In effect, the CISG has combined the U.C.C. express warranty, implied war-
ranty of merchantability and implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose into one article.
Although both the CISG and U.C.C. warranty provisions are substantially the
same, some differences do exist. For example, as regards the warranty of
merchantability, the U.C.C. limits it to sellers who are merchants with respect
to goods of that kind. Furthermore, the warranty for a particular purpose
arises under the U.C.C. only where the seller has reason to know the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill. The CISG, however, prohibits unreasonable reli-
ance on an implied warranty for a particular purpose.
Unlike the U.C.C. which requires a conspicuous writing and specific reference
to implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose
for an effective waiver, the CISG has no specific requirements for an enforcea-
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remedies.36 Parties to an international contract recognize, how-
ever, the importance of familiarity with the C.I.S.G.'s existing op-
tions to select the U.C.C. as the applicable law.3 7 The C.I.S.G.
provides uniform rules governing questions not resolved within
the contract and takes precedence over Article 2 of the U.C.C.38
The drafting history of the C.I.S.G. provides guidance in inter-
preting the meaning of complex terms and their relationship to
domestic law.3 9
•ble waiver of a warranty. An effective waiver of express and implied warranties
can be made a part of a contract under the CISG's general rules of contract
formation. Judicial interpretation will determine whether there is a distinc-
tion without a difference. This underscores the predicament of dealing with a
new law without any precedent.
Id. at 1207-08.
36. See id. (discussing major differences between C.I.S.G. and U.C.C. as to reme-
dies). Regarding the issue of remedies, Bruno and Brinza state that:
In the provisions governing remedies for breach of contract by either the
seller or the buyer, the non-breaching party, under the CISG, is given a gen-
eral right to specific performance. Article 46 of the CISG provides that, "the
buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the
buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement"
Moreover, Article 62 allows a seller to require a breaching buyer to pay the
price, take delivery or perform his other obligations. These provisions differ
from the U.C.C. which gives buyers with a limited right where the goods are
unique or otherwise unavailable in the market. Finally, the CISG does not con-
tain any provisions for the limitation or liquidation of damages similar to
those found in the U.C.C., nor does it include any specific statute of limita-
tions.
Id. at 1208.
37. See id. at 1206 (discussing major differences between C.I.S.G. and U.C.C. as to
application, formation, warranty and remedies, as well as necessity to alert counsel to
importance of familiarity with C.I.S.G. and option to elect U.C.C. as governing law).
38. Triumph, supra note 33, at 1206.
39. UNwIorn LAW, supra note 8, at 5. Professor John Honnold, who participated
actively in the negotiations of the C.I.S.G., describes the C.I.S.G. as a triumph of cooper-
ative international work. International Sale of Goods: Hearings on Treaty Doc. No. 9 Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984) (statement of Profes-
sorJohn Honnold). The C.I.S.G. has prompted, nevertheless, much scholarly literature
concerning its preparation and codification process as well as practical guides. See Peter
Winship, The U.N. Sales Convention: A Bibliography of English Language Publications, 28
INT'L LAw. 401, 401 (1994) [hereinafter Bibliography] (providing twenty-three pages of
background documents, -bibliographies, books, commentary, symposia, articles and
book chapters, congressional materials, and U.S. state department documents); Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 17 (1984); E. Allan Farnsworth, The Vienna Convention:
History and Scope, 18 IsNr'L LAw. 17, 17-20, at 2-4; Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of
Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23
INT'L LAw. 443, 443-83 (1989) (discussing need, difficulties, and willingness of compro-
mise in securing widespread acceptance of C.I.S.G.); Peter H. Pfund, Overview of the
Codification Process, 15 BRooI J. INT'L LAw 7, 17 (1989) (discussing U.S. ratification of
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a. The Legislative History of the C.I.S.G.
In the 1930's, an effort by the League of Nations40 to ad-
conventions and possibility of preemption of inconsistent provisions and procedures of
U.S. federal and state law); BradleyJ. Richards, Contracts for the International Sale of Goods:
Applicability of the United Nations Convention, 69 IOWA L. REv. 209, 209-40 (1983); Paul
Volken, The Vienna Convention: Scope, Interpretation, and Gap-Filling,, in INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECruREs 19, 19-53 (Peter Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds.,
1986) [hereinafter Dubrovnik Lectures]; James E. Joseph, Contract Formation Under the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 3 Dic.J. INT'L. L. 107, 195-215 (1984); Burt A. Lette, supra note 31, at
107-38; Christine Moccia, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods and the "Battle of the Forms," 13 Foan m INT'L L.J. 649, 649-79 (1989-90);
Amy H. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an Interna-
tional Interpretation of the Vienna Convention, 63 WASH. L. REv. 607, 649-79 (1988); Peter
Schlechtriem, The Seller's Obligations Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVEN-
TION ON CoNRAcrs FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 607-51 (Nina M. Galston &
Hans Smit eds., 1984) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL SALEs]; Lief Sevon, Obligations of the
Buyer Under the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in DUBROVNIK
LECrURES, supra, at 203, at 203-38; Mitchell Stocks, Risk of Loss Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A
Comparative Analysis and Proposed Revision of UC.C. Sections 2-509 and 2-510, 87 N.W. L.
REV. 1415, 418-51 (1993); Andrew Babiak, Comment, Defining "Fundamental Breach"
Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 6 TEMP.
INT'L. & COMP. L.J. 113, 115-43 (1992); Barry Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility in
the U.N. Convention on Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL SALES,
supra; Harry M. Flechtner, Remedies Under the New International Sales Convention: The Per-
spectivefrom Article 2 of the U.C.C., 8J.L. & COM. 53, 53-108 (1988);Joseph M. Lookofsy,
Remedies for Breach Under the CISG, in COMMERCIAL DAMAGES: A GUIDE TO REMEDIES IN
BUSINESS LITIGATION 43-1, 43-66 (Charles L. Knapp ed., 1986).
40. JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 887-88 (2d ed.
1981).
The League of Nations was the first attempt to develop a comprehensive
global international organization to preserve peace .... It was designed, in
part, to provide the machinery for mutual aid among its members if they were
victims of attack . . . [and] a much broader group of functions aimed at
preventing war. It had specific responsibilities for encouraging peaceful settle-
ment of disputes... [and] supervision over international agreements relating
to traffic in drugs and women and children, collection of information in all
matters of international interest, and direction of international bureaus. The
organization, though far from a government, nevertheless had broad compe-
tence to care for the world's welfare, and it quickly came to occupy a position
in international affairs.... It served at once as a world forum, an instrument
for continuous diplomatic negotiation, an international civil service, and an
organ of economic and social collaboration. The League could not fulfill its
political role as custodian of international security in the face of the resurgent
nationalism of the 1930's and ... the aggressive policies of Nazi Germany,
Fascist Italy, andJapan. The organization was also seriously weakened because
the United States had failed to become a member... [T]he League's eco-
nomic, financial, statistical and social services grew so significant that they
were continued even during the second world war .... The framework of
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dress the needs of the international commercial community led
to the establishment of the International Institute for the Unifi-
cation of Private Law ("UNIDROIT").41 UNIDROIT's efforts re-
sulted in two drafts on the subject of international business
transactions intended to promote uniformity among trading
partners in the international community.42 Through the League
of Nations, the drafts were distributed to league members for
comment and, ultimately, presented to the 1964 Hague Confer-
ence.43 These drafts, predecessors to the C.I.S.G.,44 adopted at
international society was so badly shattered by the war that Britain, Russia, The
United States, and China decided not to revive the League, but instead to
build a new general international organization through which they could con-
tinue their wartime collaboration and attempt to assure a durable peace... In
April 1945, 50 nations assembled at San Francisco for the United Nations Con-
ference on International Organization ... and finally, on June 26, signed the
Charter of the United Nations.
Id.
41. John 0. Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: An Overview, 27 AM.J. COMp. L. 223, 223 (1979); Kasuaki Sono, UNCITRAL and
the Vienna Sales Convention, 18 INT'L LAW. 7, 12 (1984). The International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT") was founded by the League of Nations in
1924, with the aim of examining "ways of harmonizing and coordinating the private law
of states... and to prepare.., for the adoption by Governments of uniform rules of
private law." JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 13, at 37. See generally FARNSWORTH & YOUNG,
supra note 18, at 135 (discussing work of UNIDROIT).
42. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1.
The current uniform rules [of the CISG] are rooted in two earlier Conven-
tions sponsored by the [UNIDROIT] ... These conventions - one dealing
with formation of contracts for international sale [Convention Relating to a
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods], the other with obligations of parties to such contracts [Convention
Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods] - were devel-
oped over the course of three decades by leading commercial law experts of
Western Europe and were finalized in 1964 by a diplomatic conference at the
Hague. The 1964 Hague Conventions entered into force among nine States
but .... failed to receive substantial acceptance outside Western Europe.
Id. The Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods
("ULIS") and the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods ("ULF") came into force in 1972, and are now
the law in: Belgium, The Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, the Nether-
lands, San Marino, and the United Kingdom. Winship 1, supra note 14, at 490. Conven-
tion Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834
U.N.T.S 107 [hereinafter ULIS]; Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Forma-
tion of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169
(1972) [hereinafter ULF].
43. Winship 1, supra note 14, at 194. Negotiations were interrupted during the
Second World War and its aftermath. See generally FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 18,
at 135-36 (discussing 1964 Hague Conference).
44. See Helen E. Harmell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Con-
1995] INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 677
the 1964 Hague Conference,45 included the Convention Relat-
ing to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods'
("ULIS") and the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the
Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
("ULF") .47
The ULIS explicitly rejected reference to choice-of-law
rules.48 This decision came at the price of several compromise
provisions allowing states to limit their adherence to both the
1964 conventions 49 and the eventual demise of the ULF and
ULIS sales laws ("1964 Uniform Sales Laws").5° Debate immedi-
ately ensued about the decision to exclude reference to rules of
private international law, called the universalist approach 51 of
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 5 n.13 (1993)
(discussing relationship of C.I.S.G. to earlier conventions).
45. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 18, at 135 (discussing approval of drafts
by the conference); see also Winship 1, supra note 14, at 489 (discussing start of Hague
Conference).
The Hague Conference took up this work in 1928, and its committee of ex-
perts completed a draft in 1931. The Conference itself, however, did not ap-
prove the draft until 1951. The members of the Conference signed the result-
ing international convention in 1955 and it came into force in 1964 upon the
ratification of five states.
Id.
46. ULIS, supra note 42; see Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Law Governing
the International Sale of Goods (Hague Conference Records), The Hague, 2-25 April 1964
(1966), cited in Hartnell, supra note 44, at 5 n.13; Bibliography: International Sale of Goods,
27 AM. J. COMP. L. 345, 345-51 (1979) (presenting collection of ULIS literature).
47. ULF, supra note 42. See Bibliography: International Sale of Goods, supra note 46,
at 345-51. Farnsworth and Young characterize the ULF as being "a shorter companion
uniform law" to the ULIS. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 18, at 135.
48. Winship 1, supra note 14, at 491. "The 1964 Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Goods explicitly rejects reference to rules of private international law." Id. "In
current usage, the term 'private international law' may be ambiguous. In the context of
discussion of the 1964 ULIS, the reference is to choice-of-law rules." Id.
49. Id. at 493-99.
50. Id. at 490. "Noting the limited success of these conventions, the U.N. Commis-
sion on International Trade Law prepared a revised, consolidated treaty." Id. The
ULIS and ULF were finalized in 1964 by a diplomatic conference at the Hague ("The
1964 Convention"). DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text (discussing two conventions finalized in 1964 at Hague).
51. Report of the Secretaiy-General, Pending Questions with Respect to the Revised Text of a
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/100, Annex 3
(1987) (defining universalist approach as broad rule of applicability of law). The uni-
versalist approach of the 1964 Convention was summarized in a report of the U.N.
Secretary General in the following terms:
ULIS directed the fora of Contracting States to apply the Law to all interna-
tional sales even though neither the seller nor the buyer (nor the sales transac-
tion) had any contact with any Contracting State (ULIS article 1 (1), art 2 (ex-
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the 1964 Uniform Sales Laws.52
Ultimately, these conventions proved unsuccessful because
they failed to garner acceptance outside Western Europe."3 As a
consequence of the limited acceptance of these two conven-
tions,54 as well as other related technical and psychological
clusion of rules of private international law)). This broad rule of applicability
of the Law (sometimes termed the 'universalist' approach) was subject to the
possibility of reservations under articles III, IV and V of the Hague Sales Con-
vention.
Id. at 1208. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing two conventions
finalized in 1964 at Hague that explicitly rejected reference to private international law
rules).
52. Kurt Nadelmann, The Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods: A Conflict of
Laws Imbroglio, 74 YALE L.J. 449, 450-51 (1965). Nadelmann described the situation as
.a conflict of laws imbroglio" that could lead to "shocking" results. Id. at 457.
Nadelmann argued as follows:
[I]f a person in Canada sells goods to a person in the United States which
goods must be shipped to the United States, in any subsequent disputes be-
tween the parties respecting the transaction either party can - notwithstand-
ing the fact that neither the United States nor Canada has adopted the Uni-
form Law - take advantage of the -law if its relevant provisions are more
favorable to that party than the otherwise applicable law. The party merely
brings suit in a "contracting" state which will automatically apply the Uniform
Law.
Id. See Kurt Nadelmann, The Conflicts Pmblems of the Uniform Law on the International Sale
of Goods, 14 Am. J. COMP. L. 236, 236 (1965) (discussing forum shopping which is "a
clear violation of... due process of law"). See also HaroldJ. Berman, The Uniform Law
on International Sale of Goods: A Constructive Critique, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 354, 355
n.2 (1965) (stating that Nadelman's view "convincingly criticize[s]" ULIS "exclusion of
private international law"); Winship 1, supra note 14, at 501-02 (discussing "universalist"
controversy).
On the other hand, Professor Andre' Tunc noted that few courts took jurisdiction
of cases that had no connection with the forum, suggesting that there would be few
"shocking" cases of the kind presented by Professor Nadelman. Afidr6 Tunc, Commen-
tary on the Hague Conventions of the 1st of July 1964 on International Sale of Goods and the
Formation of the Contract of Sale, in 1 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE UNIFICATION OF
LAW GOVERNING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SALE OF GOODS - RECORDS 355, 362-63
(1966). Commentary by governments reflected divisions similar to that of the scholarly
literature. Winship 1, supra note 14, at 502.
53. DOCUMENTARY HIsrORY, supra note 17, at 1. See supra note 42 and accompany-
ing text (discussing failure of 1964 Conventions to receive substantial acceptance
outside Western Europe).
54. See United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, U.N. Sales No. E.81.IV.3 (1981). Only the following
eight states ratified or acceded to the ULF: Belgium, Gambia, Germany, Israel, Italy,
the Netherlands, San Marino, and the United Kingdom. Id. The ULIS was ratified or
acceded to by those same states, except Israel. Id. The United States was not a party to
the drafting of these documents and did not ratify the conventions. See id. (stating
United States not named as party to negotiations or states of ratification). Cf FARNS-
WORTH & YOUNG, supra note 18, at 36 (discussing how United States "quickly put to-
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problems,55 the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"),56 which was created in. 1966, 57 was
authorized, in 1969, to create a Working Group on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods58 ("UNCITRAL Working Group") to con-
sider what changes to the 1964 uniform laws would make them
more acceptable for adoption.59 The UNCITRAL Working
Group, consisting of representatives. from, fourteen member
gether a delegation to Hague" to consider previously prepared draft). The drafting
sessions of the ULF and ULIS were dominated by Western Europe and thus heavily
influenced by their civil law tradition. Id.; Garro, supra note 39, at 450-51 (1989).
55. See Introduction to the Symposium, supra note 23, at 419 (discussing technical and
psychological problems with ULIS and ULF). For further background on the 1964
Hague Sales Convention, see John Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales, 107 U.
PA. L. REv. 299 (1959);John Honnold, The Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods:
The Hague Convention of 1964, 30 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 326 (1965).
56. Establishment of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A.
Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 99, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
The United Nations established the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law "UNCITRAL" in 1966 for the specific purpose of promoting the unification
and harmonization of international trade law. Id. The UNCITRAL is a law-making
body with world-wide representation. Introduction to the Symposium, supra note 23, at
419. "The Commission's membership, limited to 36 States, includes representation of
each region of the world and each major legal and economic system." Id. A decade of
intense work produced agreement on a draft Convention that a diplomatic conference
of 62 States unanimously finalized and approved in 1980. Id.; see FARNSWORTH &
YOUNG, supra note 18, at 136 (discussing drafting and approval of C.I.S.G.). The United
States participates in UNCITRAL as a U.N. member. JACKSON & DAvI., supra note 13,
at 37.
57. Winship 1, supra note 14, at 502. The creation of UNCITRAL in 1966 provided
a new forum for official debate, regarding how to make the 1964 uniform laws more
acceptable, and governments picked up where they left off at the 1964 conference. Id.
The Federal Republic of Germany and others observed that the uniform laws would put
an end to the uncertainties involved in the application of the rules of private interna-
tional law, and, therefore, reservations should be discouraged. See id. (discussing Ger-
many, Belgium, and Netherlands' opposition to reservations).
The United States and others argued that the exclusion of private international law
rules was a deterrent to adoption of the laws, because they could become applicable to
parties who had no expectation that the uniform laws might apply. See id. (discussing
views of United States, Czechoslovakia, and Norway).
58. DOCUMENTARY HIsTORv, supra note 17, at 2. The C.I.S.G. was made in three
stages: "(1) The UNCITRAL Working Group (1970-1977); (2) Review by the full Com-
mission (1977-1978); (3) The Diplomatic Conference (1980)." Id.
In 1969 UNCITRAL established a 14-State Working Group on the Interna-
tional Sales of Goods with the mandate to prepare draft legislation that would
facilitate acceptance of the uniform rules "by countries of different legal, so-
cial, and economic systems". This Working Group, under the effective chair-
manship of Professor Jorge Barrera Graf of Mexico, completed this task in
nine sessions (1970-1977).
Id. at 3.
59. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its
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states,6 ° drafted C.I.S.G.
6 1
Despite their unification efforts, the states participating in
the UNCITRAL negotiations could not reach agreement on sev-
eral topics. 62 The UNCITRAL Working Group chose to exclude
those topics from coverage under the C.I.S.G. rather than risk
the failure of the entire convention.63 Due to differences in do-
mestic treatment of products liability,64 for example, consumer
sales were expressly excluded.65 Likewise, liability for personal
injury and death were excluded,66 as were traditional defenses to
the formation of contracts, including: fraud,67 duress,68 and un-
Second Session, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 18, 38, U.N. Doc. A/7618 (1969); see
FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 18, at 136 (discussing UNCITRAL Working Group).
60. Documentary History, supra note 17, at 3. In contrast to the situation surround-
ing the drafting of the ULIS and ULF, the United States was an active participant in the
UNCITRAL working group leading to the drafting and approval of the C.I.S.G. FARNS-
WORTH & YOUNG, supra note 18, at 136.
61. See Winship 1, supra note 14, at 489-91 (discussing analysis and evolution of
harmonizing international law post-1964 and pre-1980). See generally DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY, supra note 17 (providing documents pertaining to drafting history of C.I.S.G.).
62. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 17, at 31 (discussing topics omitted be-
cause of differences in domestic treatment).
63. See id. (discussing risk of negotiating failure and preclusion of controversial
topics).
64. Sara G. Zwart, The New International Law of Sales: A Marriage Between Socialist,
Third World, Common, and Civil Law Principles, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 109, 111
(1988). See Laura E. Longobardi, Note, Disclaimers of Implied Warranties: The 1980 United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 53 FoDHAM L. REv. 863,
863 n.1. (1985) (providing collective applicable U.S. law prior to C.I.S.G.'s effective
date); Kastely, supra note 39, at 609-12 (addressing irreconcilable conceptual differ-
ences among legal cultures).
65. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 2(a), 19 I.L.M. at 672.
[C.I.S.G.] does not apply to sales: (a) of goods bought for personal, family or
household use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the
contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were bought
for any such use....
Id.
66. Id. art. 5, 19 I.L.M. at 673. The C.I.S.G. is inapplicable "to the liability of the
seller for death or personal injury caused by the goods to any person." Id.
67. See UNIFORM LAW, supra note 8, at 96 (discussing issues excluded from Conven-
tion). "Fraud" is defined as:
An intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in
reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to sur-
render a legal right. A false representation of a matter of fact, whether by
words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of
that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. Anything calcu-
lated to deceive, whether by a single act or combination, or by suppression of
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conscionability.6 9 Thus, unlike previous efforts to establish a
uniform international contract law,70 the C.I.S.G. is not and does
not purport to be a complete and exclusive set of international
rules distinct from the many bodies of domestic law, which tend
to be interpreted against a background of institutions and rules
well known to each forum court.71 Nevertheless, the UNCITRAL
truth, or suggestion of what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or innu-
endo, by speech or silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture.
BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 455-57 (6th ed. 1991). See RESTATEMENT (FiRST) CONTRACTS
§ 471 (1982 App.) (defining fraud).
68. See UNIFORM LAW, supra note 8, at 98 (discussing issues excluded from Conven-
tion). "Duress" is defined as:
Any unlawful threat or coercion used by a person to induce another to act (or
to refrain from acting) in a manner he or she otherwise would not (or would).
Subjecting person to improper pressure which overcomes his will and coerces
him to comply with demand to which he would not yield if acting as free
agent. Application of such pressure or constraint as compels man to go against
his will, and takes away his free agency, destroying power of refusing to comply
with unjust demands of another.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 348 (6th ed. 1991). See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONTRACTS
§ 492 (1982 App.) (defining duress).
69. See UNIFORM LAW, supra note 8, at 98 (discussing issues excluded from Conven-
tion). "Unconscionability" is defined as:
A doctrine under which courts may deny enforcement of unfair or op-
pressive contracts because of procedural abuses arising out of the contract
formation, or because of substantive abuses relating to terms of the contract,
such as terms which violate reasonable expectations of parties or which involve
gross disparities in price; either abuse can be the basis for a finding of uncon-
scionability.
Basic test of "unconscionability" of contract is whether under circum-
stances existing at time of making of contract and in light of general commer-
cial background and commercial needs of particular trade or case, clauses in-
volved are so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise party.
Unconscionability is generally recognized to include an absence of mean-
ingful choice on the part of one of the parties, to a contract together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.
BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY 1059 (6th ed. 1991).
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remain-
der of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the appli-
cation of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 208 (Supp. 1989).
70. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text (discussing two conventions final-
ized in 1964 at Hague and their failure as result of rejecting private international law
rules and applying universalist approach).
71. See C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 1, 19 I.L.M. at 672 (leaving open possibility of
choice-of-law references to contracting state's laws). In contrast, Article 2 of ULIS virtu-
ally bans the rules of private international law from the realm of the uniform law, and
Article 17 of ULIS provides that questions not expressly resolved by the ULIS are to be
settled in conformity with the general principles on which the ULIS is based. CESARE
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Working Group's final draft of the C.I.S.G. based upon revisions
of the ULF and the ULIS,72 was implemented with unprece-
dented speed.7" On October 9, 1986, the U.S. Senate gave its
advice and consent to ratification of the C.I.S.G.7 4 By December
1986, the United States and ten other countries75 deposited 76
instruments of ratification. 77 By January 1, -1988, the effective
date of the C.I.S.G.,78 six additional states had adopted the
C.I.S.G. 79 By 1992, a total of thirty-two states had ratified the
C.I.S.G.8 °
M. BIANCA & MICHAEL J. BONNELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW:
THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CoNVENTIoN 843, 864 (1987). The ultimate aim of C.I.S.G. is to
achieve worldwide uniformity in the law governing contracts for international sale of
goods. Id. at 866; see U.N. Special' Commission, Note of theSpecial Commission on the
Observations Presented by Various Governments and by the I. C. C. Relating to the 1956 Draft of a
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. V/Prep./3 (noting that ULIS
"should as far as possible, be self-sufficient"). See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying
text (distinguishing ULIS and ULF).'
72. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 17, at 15-16.
73. Introduction to the Symposium, supra note 23, at 419. "[T]he 1980 Sales Conven-
tion has been implemented with unprecedented speed." Id. The C.I.S.G., adopted by
the United States at a diplomatic conference convened in Vienna in 1980, received the
requisite two-thirds advice and consent from the Senate and was subsequently ratified
by President Reagan. Id. The aim of the C.I.S.G. is to provide unification of interna-
tional trade law. Id. C.I.S.G. focuses on the function of the sales contract between
parties. Id.
74. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,773-74 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986).
75. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1 n.1. The eleven original ratifying
states of the C.I.S.G. were: Argentina, Egypt, France, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho, Peoples'
Republic of China, Syria, United States of America, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. See Robert
S. Rendell, The New U.N. Convention on International Sales Contracts: An Overview, 15
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 23, 43 (1989) (identifying original ratifying states).
76. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 89, 19 I.L.M. at 692. The Secretary-General of the
United Nations is the designated depositary for the Convention. Id.
77. Id. art. 99(1), 19 LL.M. at 694. The C.I.S.G. is effective twelve months after
the deposit of the tenth ratification. Id. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing initial ratifying states to C.I.S.G.).
78. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, supra
note 24, at 384 (listing states that have deposited instruments of ratification, including
United States).
79. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 99(2), 19 I.L.M. at 694 (governing when Conven-
tion becomes effective for those signatory states ratifying Convention after initial ten
ratifying states). The six additional ratifying states, with the respective effective dates,
were: Austria, Finland, Mexico, and Sweden, effective January 1, 1989; Australia, effec-
tive April 1, 1989; and Norway effective August 1, 1989; See Rendell, supra note 75, at 43
(identifying subsequent ratifying states).
80. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra' note 18, at 136.
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b. The Purpose and Provisions of the C.I.S.G.
The objectives of the C.I.S.G. are to unify the law for the
international sale of goods." The C.I.S.G., which is divided into
four parts, aims to govern all aspects of contracts made between
commercial parties in all states that have ratified, accepted, ap-
proved, or acceded to the C.I.S.G. 2 So long as differences exist
between international legal systems, however, problems of con-
flict of laws remain."3
Part I of the C.I.S.G., Articles 1 through 6, provides general
rules for determining whether the C.I.S.G. applies to a particular
contract.8 4 In general, the C.I.S.G. applies only to contracts for
the sale of goods 5 between parties whose places of business are
in different states,86 which in turn are contracting states under
81. See C.I.S.G., supra note 17, arts. 1-3, 19 I.L.M. at 672 (discussing sphere of ap-
plication of C.I.S.G.). See genera/ly Murphy, supra note 21 (discussing unifying effects of
C.I.S.G.).
82. See C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 99(2), 19 I.L.M. at 694 (governing when Con-
vention becomes effective for those signatory states ratifying convention after initial ten
ratifying states). See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing initial ratifying
states to C.I.S.G.).
83. Diamond, supra note 3, at 308.
84. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, arts. 1-6, 19 I.L.M. at 672-73 (general rules for deter-
mining applicability of C.I.S.G.). Of particular importance is Article 1 (1), which pro-
vides that "[tihis Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties
whose places of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of
a Contracting State." Id. art. 1(1), 19 I.L.M. at 672. See UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at
77-84 (explaining application and interpretation of Article 1 (1)).
85. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 1(1), 19 I.L.M. at 672. "Sale of goods" is not de-
fined in the C.I.S.G., but the term has been construed to refer to "assets that are corpo-
real and moveable." UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 88. Cf C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art.
3(2), 19 I.L.M. at 672 (convention not applicable to contracts where "preponderant
part of the obligations of the party" supplying goods consists of supplying "labour or
other services"). See UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 89-90, 92-93 (discussing "mixed
contracts" for goods and services under C.I.S.G.). This restriction on applicability to
sales of "goods" is similar to the corresponding limitation under the U.C.C. See supra
note 20 and accompanying text (discussing that U.C.C. is limited to sales of goods).
86. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 1(1), 19 I.L.M. at 672. This requirement has been
characterized as a "basic criterion of internationality." UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at
78. For purposes of this criterion, "place of business" does not depend upon the "na-
tionality" of the parties to the contract, a factor which is expressly not "to be taken into
consideration in determining the application of this Convention." C.I.S.G., supra note
17, art. 1(3), 19 I.L.M. at 672; See id. art. 10, 19 I.L.M. at 674 (explaining how to deter-
mine party's "place of business"). See also, UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 78-81, 150-51
(discussing "place of business" under Convention). The Convention places one major
limitation on the criterion of internationality. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 1(2), 19
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the C.I.S.G.8 7 Hence, if each party has its place of business in a
different contracting state, the C.I.S.G. applies,88 unless by con-
tract the parties either exclude its application89 or derogate from
or vary the effect of any C.I.S.G. provision.9"
I.L.M. at 672. For purposes of determining whether the Convention applies, interna-
tionality in fact is disregarded if "this fact does not appear either from the contract or
from any dealings between, or from information disclosed by, the parties at any time
before or at the conclusion of the contract." Id.
87. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 1(1)(a), 19 I.L.M. at 672. Honnold characterizes
Article 1 (a) as a choice-of-law rule, directed at the fora of all contracting states, that
"lays down a unified and authoritative rule of private international law on the applica-
bility of the Convention." UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 81. "[T]he [C.I.S.G.] refers to
'the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law' to fill gaps." Win-
ship 1, supra note 14, at 491.
Choice-of-law rules do, however, have a limited role to play when filling gaps
in the text .... In the absence of such an express reference to national law,
the reader faced with gaps in the text is directed to refer to the general princi-
ples.
Id. at 493.
88. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. l(1)(a), 19 I.L.M. at 672. The C.I.S.G. itself ex-
cludes from this general rule mixed contracts in which the preponderant part of the
selling party's obligations is to supply labor or other services. Id. art. 3(2), 19 I.L.M. at
672; see supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing "mixed contracts"). The
C.I.S.G. excludes from its application the following types of contracts:
[S]ales:
(a) of goods bought for personal, family or household use, if before or at the
time of contracting the seller knew or should have known of the use;
(b) by auction;
(c) on execution or under other authority of law;
(d) of stock, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments or money;
(5) of ships, vessels, hovercraft and aircraft;
(6) of electricity.
C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 2, 19 I.L.M. at 672. See UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 85-90
(discussing exclusions from Convention).
In addition, the C.I.S.G. does not affect "the validity of the contract or of any of its
provisions or of any usage." C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 4(a), 19 I.L.M. at 673; see Kas-
tely, supra note 39, at 644-46 (analyzing applicability and effect of this exception). Nor
does the C.I.S.G. concern "the effect which the contract may have on the property in
the goods sold." C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 4(b), 19 I.L.M. at 673; see UNIFORM LAW,
supra note 8, at 99 (discussing intended effect of exception). Finally, by its own terms,
the C.I.S.G. "does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or personal injury
caused by the goods to any person." C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 5, 19 I.L.M. at 673; see
UNIFORM LAW, supra note 8, at 100-04 (discussing reasons for and effect of Article 5).
89. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 6, 19 I.L.M. at 673. See UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8,
at 105 (discussing effect of Article 6); see also Farnsworth, supra note 17, at 440-42 (dis-
cussing interrelationship of Articles 4 and 6 concerning validity of contract). See gener-
ally Rendell, supra note 75, at 25-26 (discussing Article 6 as "freedom of contract" prin-
ciple).
90. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 6, 19 I.L.M. at 673. Derogation or variance under
Article 6 is subject to the parameters of Article 12, which permits contracting states to
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An alternative basis for application of the C.I.S.G. exists in
situations where choice-of-law principles would require the ap-
plication of the law of a contracting state.9' Under this alterna-
tive test: (1) both parties to an international sale of goods are in
different states; (2) only one party is a C.I.S.G. signatory; and (3)
the parties have not contracted to apply a law other than the law
of the C.I.S.G. signatory state.9 2 The United States submitted a
declaration under Article 9593 indicating that it would not be
bound by this alternative basis for application of the C.I.S.G.94
The result of this reservation is that a non-member cannot in-
voke its state's choice-of-law principles to invoke C.I.S.G. protec-
tion 95 where the United States is a party to the contract.96
Part I of the C.I.S.G. also includes general rules for inter-
preting the statements and conduct of parties in accordance
with their intent.97 C.I.S.G. Articles 7 through 13 set forth the
preserve formal requirements in domestic law without derogation or variance by con-
tract parties. Id. arts. 12, 96, 19 I.L.M. at 674, 693-94; see UNiFORM LAW, supra note 8, at
155-56 (discussing reservations under Article 96 to trigger application of Article 12).
91. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 1 (1) (b), 19 I.L.M. at 672. "This Convention applies
to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different
States ... when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law
of a Contracting State." Id.; see UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 82-84 (discussing Article
1 (1) (b) and effect of reservations under Article 95, excluding application of Article
I(I)(b)); see aLso Randall & Norris, supra note 21, at 612-17 (discussing scope of
C.I.S.G.); Winship 1, supra note 14, at 491 (discussing effect of Article 1(1)(b)); Lisa K.
Tomko, United States Convention on the International Sale of Goods: Its Effect on United States
and Canadian Sales Law, 66 U. DET. L. REv. 73, 78-82 (1988) (discussing effect of U.S.
reservation from Article 1 (1) (b)).
92. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 1, 19 LL.M. at 672.
93. Id. art. 95, 19 I.L.M. at 693. "Any State may declare at the time of the deposit
of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession that it will not be
bound by subparagraph (1) (b) of article 1 of this Convention." Id.; see supra note 28
(quoting text of Article 1 (1) (b)).
94. Status of the Convention: Note by the Secretariat, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/294
(1987). Despite this declaration, parties to an international contract may, nevertheless,
choose to have their contract governed by the provisions of the C.I.S.G., since "there is
no provision [in the C.I.S.G.] that addresses the question whether the parties may make
the Convention applicable to transactions that fall outside the scope of Articles 1-5."
UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 107.
95. See supra note 93 (providing text of C.I.S.G. Article 95). See supra note 92 and
accompanying text (providing text of discussing Article 1 (1) (b)).
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. refusal to apply
C.I.S.G. to transactions involving C.I.S.G. non-members).
97. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 8, 19 I.L.M. at 673. Article 8 provides that:
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other con-
duct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other
party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.
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C.I.S.G.'s general interpretive provisions,98 which provide that,
as a general rule, the provisions be interpreted in light of the
C.I.S.G's international character.' This basic criterion of inter-
nationality requires that the C.I.S.G. applies only between parties
whose places of business are in different states.100 Place of busi-
ness does not depend upon the nationality of the parties to the
contract, a factor that is expressly excluded in determining the
application of the C.I.S.G.10
C.I.S.G's overall objective is to promote uniformity in the
application of contract rules and the observance of good faith in
international trade.'0 2 Questions of contract interpretation are
to be settled by reference to any law considered applicable
under international choice-of-law rules.1 03  The interpretation
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding
that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had
in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable
person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant circum-
stances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties
have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of
the parties.
Id.; see UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 136-43 (discussing scope and application of Arti-
cle 8).
98. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, arts. 7-13, 19 I.L.M. at 673-74.
99. Id. art. 7(1), 19 LL.M. at 673. See UNIFORM LAW, supra note 8, at 113-23 (dis-
cussing Article 7(1)). See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing basic crite-
rion of "internationality").
100. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing application of C.I.S.G.).
101. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing internationality).
102. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 7(1), 19 I.L.M. at 673. See UNIFORM LAw, supra
note 8, at 123-25 (explaining "good faith" provision); see also C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art.
7(2), 19 I.L.M. at 673. "Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general
principles on which it is based." Id. "A... generous reading will be necessary to iden-
tify the Convention's underlying general principles and to use them to fill gaps." Win-
ship 1, supra note 14, at 520. "If the reader is generous in his approach to the conven-
tion text there should be little need to consult conflicts rules and then prove the appli-
cable law-especially as the reader is also under the injunction in article 7(1) to
promote uniformity in interpretation." Id. See generally UNIFORM LAW, supra note 8, at
125-33 (discussing "gap-filling" under Article 7(2)); see supra note 87 and accompanying
text (discussing Article 1(1) (a) as choice-of-law rule and gap-filler).
103. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 7(2), 19 I.L.M. at 673. "In the interpretation of
[the C.I.S.G.], regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to
promote uniformity." Id. art. 7(1), 19 I.L.M. at 673. In the absence of settled general
principles, questions governed by the C.I.S.G. that are not expressly settled in it are to
be settled in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private interna-
tional law. Id.
1995] INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 687
and determination of the law of the forum necessarily would fall
to the judges applying the lex fori.1 °4 If a choice of law is not
express, for example, Article 8 allows the applicable law to be
determined by the circumstances of the case or from the con-
tract's terms, so long as the other party knew or should have
known the other party's intent with regards to which law should
apply. 10 5 Whether a person knew or should have known the law
applicable to the international contract can be based on the
"reasonable person" standard. 106 The C.I.S.G. also provides that
the determination of the applicable trade usage rules be based
upon the rules agreed to by the parties and upon the practices
established between them. 0 7 Furthermore, the C.I.S.G. does
not require a contract to be evidenced by a writing,108 or to com-
104. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, LaApp. 5 Cir., 483 So.2d 1152, 1154 (providing general
rule that "substantive rights are determined by the law of the place where the action
arose (lex loci); while the procedural rights are governed by the law of the place of the
forum (lex fori)"). See also BLACK'S LAw DicnoNARY 630 (6th ed. 1993). The lexfori is
defined as:
The law of the forum, or court; that is, the positive law of the state, country, or
jurisdiction of whose judicial system the court where the suit is brought or
remedy sought is an integral part. Substantive rights are determined by the
law of the place where the action arose, "lex loci," while the procedural rights
are governed by the law of the place of the form, "lex fori." See Lex loci
contractus.
Id.
105. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 8., 19 I.L.M. at 673. See supra note 87 and accom-
panying text (characterizing Article 1 (a) of C.I.S.G. as choice-of-law rule). See supra
note 102 and accompanying text (discussing gap-filling in conformity with C.I.S.G.'s
general principles).
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (interpreting statements and other
conduct of party are according to party's intent or according to understanding that
reasonable person would have).
107. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 9, 19 I.L.M. at 674. Article 9 provides:
The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any
practices which they have established between themselves. (2) The parties are
considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to
their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to
have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly
observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade
concerned.
Id. See UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 144-49 (discussing role of usages and practices
under C.I.S.G.)
108. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 11, 19 I.L.M. at 674. "A contract of sale need not
be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as
to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses." Id. See id. art. 13, 19
I.L.M. at 674 (discussing the meaning of "writing" under the convention). Article 13
provides "[flor the purposes of this Convention 'writing' includes telegram and telex."
Id.
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ply with any other requirement as to form to interpret obliga-
tions under an international contract. 0 9 While Part I of the
C.I.S.G. provides rules of interpretation and application, Part II
provides rules concerning the formation of an international con-
tract for the sale of goods in Part II.110 Part III of the C.I.S.G.
provides rules concerning the obligations of the seller11 and the
buyer under the contract;" 2 general provisions on breach of
contract," 3 avoidance," 4 notice," 5 specific performance,"' and
109. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 11, 19 I.L.M. at 674. But see id. arts. 12, 96, supra
note 17, 19 I.L.M. at 674, 693-94 (permitting contracting state to require formalities
pursuant to declaration under Article 96). But cf. UNIFORM LAW, supra note 8, at 152-56
(discussing effect of Articles 11 and 12). The United States did not make a reservation
under Article 96. See Farnsworth, supra note 17, at 440 n.5 (discussing effect of Article
11).
110. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, arts. 14-24, 19 I.L.M. at 674-77; see UNIFORM LAW,
supra note 8, at 159-207 (discussing rules for contract formation).
111. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, arts. 30-52, 19 I.L.M. at 678-83. For a discussion of the
obligations of the seller, see UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 233-332. The seller must
deliver the goods and hand over any document as required by the contract. C.I.S.G.,
supra note 17, arts. 30-34, 19 I.L.M. 678-79. The seller must deliver conforming goods
as required by the contract free of third party claims. Id. arts. 35-44, 19 I.L.M. 679-81.
If the seller is in breach of contract he is liable to the buyer for remedies. Id. arts. 45-
52, 19 I.L.M. at 681-83. The C.I.S.G. also identifies certain obligations common to sell-
ers and buyers. Id. arts. 71-88, 19 I.L.M. 687-92. These include provisions regarding
anticipatory breach, installment contracts, damages, and interest payments for damages
recoverable. In addition provisions exempting performance and damages, effects of
avoidance, and preservation of goods. Id.
112. C.I.8.G., supra note 17, arts. 53-65, 19 I.LM. at 683-86. See UNIFORM LAW,
supra note 8 at 333-66 (discussing obligations of buyer.) The buyer must pay for the
goods and take delivery as required by the contract. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, arts. 53-60,
19 I.L.M. at 683-85. If the buyer is in breach of contract he is liable to the seller for
remedies. Id. arts. 61-65, 19 I.L.M. at 685-86. The C.I.S.G. also identifies certain obliga-
tions by the buyer to pay the price after the risk has passed to the buyer and the goods
are lost or damaged. Id. arts. 66-70, 19 I.L.M. at 686-87.
113. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 25, 19 I.L.M. at 677. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
CoNTRAcrs § 462 (1932) (defining breach of contract).
A breach of contract is a non-performance of any contractual duty of immedi-
ate performance. A breach may be total or partial, and may take place by
failure to perform acts promised, by prevention or hinderance, or by repudia-
tion.
Id.
114. C.I.S.G., supra note 16, art. 26, 19 I.L.M. at 677. "A declaration of avoidance
of the contract is effective only if made by notice to the other party." Id.
115. Id. art. 27, 19 I.L.M. at 677.
Unless otherwise expressly provided in this Part of the Convention, if any no-
tice, request or other communication is given or made by a party in accord-
ance with this Part and by means appropriate in the circumstances, a delay or
error in the transmission of the communication or its failure to arrive does not
deprive that party of the right to rely on the communication.
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modification or termination"' and provisions on passage of
risk" 8 under the contract.119 The United States has not, in ac-
cordance with the reservations provision of the C.I.S.G.,"2 ° re-
served against the application of the C.I.S.G.12 ' to the bases of
U.S. contract formation (Part II)122 and sales law (Part III).123
2. The U.C.C.
The U.C.C., adopted by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") and the Ameri-
can Law Institute124 ("ALI") in 1952, was comprehensively re-
vised in 1956, 1958, 1962, and 1972, and has since been in
whole, or substantially, by all States.12 5 The U.C.C. aims to pro-
Id.
116. Id. art. 28, 19 I.L.M. at 677.
If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is entitled
to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not
bound to enter ajudgement for specific performance unless the court would
do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by
this Convention.
Id.
117. Id. art. 29, 19 I.L.M. at 677.
(1) A contract may be modified or terminated by the mere agreement of
the parties.
(2) A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modifi-
cation or termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise
modified or terminated by agreement. However, a party may be precluded by
his conduct from asserting such a provision to the extent that the other party
has relied on that conduct.
Id.
118. Id. arts. 66-70, 19 I.L.M. at 686-87. See QUINN'S DIGEsr, supra note 18, at 2-171
(discussing parties are best situated to shift burden and allocate risk or burden as be-
tween parties).
119. See UNIFoRM LAW, supra note 8, at 367-90 (discussing passage of risk provi-
sions under C.I.S.G.).
120. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 96, 19 I.L.M. 693-94.
121. Id. art. 1(1)(b), 19 I.L.M. at 672. See supra note 28 and accompanying text
(providing text of C.I.S.G.).
122. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, 19 I.L.M. at 674-77. See supra note 110 and accompa-
nying text (identifying Part II of C.I.S.G. concerning the formation of international
contract for sale of goods).
123. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, 19 I.L.M. at 677-92. See supra notes 111-18 and accom-
panying text (identifying Part III of C.I.S.G. concerning obligations of seller and buyer
under contract, as well as general provisions on breach of contract, avoidance, notice,
specific performance, and modification or termination plus provisions on passage of
risk under contract).
124. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 18, at 2.
125. See QurnN's DIGEST, supra note 18, at 147-48 (setting forth table of state adop-
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vide uniformity of, sales law 'among the States. 1 6  While the
U.C.C. contains many provisions,12 7 Article 2 applies directly to
the contract between parties for the sale of goods.'
28
a. The Legislative History of the U.C.C.
The origins of the U.C.C. lie in the lex mercatoria, 129 a spe-
cialized body of custom or usage developed and overseen by
merchants themselves13 0 that governed contracts dealing with
commercial matters until the seventeenth century. 13' The law
merchant was applied by courts composed of merchants. 32
tion); see generally id. (providing state variations from official text on provision by provi-
sion basis).
126. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
127. U.C.C. Article 1, General Provisions; Article 2, Sales; Article 2A, Leases; Arti-
cle 3, Commercial Paper; Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections; Article 4A, Funds
Transfers; Article 5, Letters of Credit; Article 6, Bulk Transfers; Article 7, Warehouse
Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other Documents of Title; Article 8, Investment Securi-
ties; Article 9, Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper. See QUINN'S
DIGEST, supra note 18 (providing exhaustive analysis of each of Code's eleven substan-
tive articles).
128. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of U.C.C. to
sale of goods).
129. See Bank of Conway v. Stary, 200 N.W. 505, 508-09 (N.D. 1924) (defining lex
mercatoria).
[Lex mercatoria is] a system of law that does not rest exclusively on the institu-
tions and local customs of any particular country, but consists of certain princi-
ples of equity and usages of trade which general convenience and a common
sense of justice have established to regulate the dealings of merchants and
mariners in all commercial countries of the civilized world.... This common
law of merchants is of more universal authority than the common law of Eng-
land.
Bank of Conway, 200 N.W. at 508 (citations omitted).
130. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CorArcrs 29 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter CON-
TRAcrs] (discussing historical role of the law merchant).
The law of documentary sales is a product of the custom of the international
community of merchants, shipowners, marine insurance underwriters, and
bankers of many countries. It has developed over many centuries as part of
the international law merchant.... In the United States it has been restated
and systematized in the Uniform Commercial Code which expressly refers to
the law merchant as a supplementary source of law.
Harold J. Berman & Monica Ladd, Risk of Loss or Damage in Documentary Transactions
Under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 21 CORNELL INT'L. LJ. 423, 425-26
(1988). "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law
and equity, including the law merchant.., shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-
103.
131. CoNTRacrs, supra note 130, at 34.
132. Id.
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Much of this merchant law made its way into the common law,13 3
but the common law applicable to contracts for the sale of goods
remained primarily a complex body of case decisions." 4 By
1893, this body of law had been reduced to statute in Great Brit-
ain.3 5 In the United States, the NCCUSL 3 6 undertook a similar
codification effort, which resulted, in 1906, in the drafting of the
Uniform Sales Act ("USA"). 3 7 The USA had only limited appli-
cation to contracts for the sale of goods, however, which re-
133. Id.
Large amounts of this [merchant] law were carried into the English common
law.... This was due in substantial part to Lord Mansfield, one of England's
most noted judges, who became ChiefJustice of the King's Bench in 1756. In
controversies between merchants, he made it a point to ascertain and apply
the usages of the trade, sometimes using a special jury of merchants to advise
him on commercial practices. But the influence of the law merchant on the
common law relating to the sale of goods was limited, and a complex body of
case law developed in this field in Britain. This law was reduced to statutory
form by the British Sale of Goods Act in 1893.
Id.
134. Id. at 29 (discussing historical role of law merchant).
The origins of the Uniform Commercial Code lie in the law merchant, a spe-
cialized body of usages, or customs, that governed contracts dealing with com-
mercial matters until the seventeenth century. The law merchant was applied
by courts composed of merchants convened to pass on disputes that arose at
the fairs that were the centers for much of early trade. Large amounts of this
law were carried into the English common law of negotiable instruments and
insurance. This was due in substantial part to Lord Mansfield, on of England's
most noted judges, who became ChiefJustice of the King's Bench in 1756. In
controversies between merchants, he made it a point to ascertain and apply
the usages of the trade, sometimes using a special jury of merchants to advise
him on commercial practices. But the influence of the law merchant on the
common law relating to the sale of goods was limited, and a complex body of
case law developed in this field in Britain. This law was reduced to statutory
form by the British Sale of Goods Act in 1893. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws entrusted to [Samuel W.] Williston the
task of producing a similar statute for the American States. His draft of a
Uniform Sales Act was approved by the Commissioners in 1906 and was even-
tually adopted by over 30 states. Like its British cousin, however, it had little to
say about contractual problems arising out of the sale of goods, and these
remained largely governed by case law.
Id. "At the close of the Second World War, the Commissioners joined forces with the
American Law Institute in preparing a comprehensive Uniform Commercial Code." Id.
at 29-30.
135. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing historical development
of 1986 British Sale of Goods Act).
136. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing historical role of NC-
CUSL).
137. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing historical development
of British Sale of Goods Act and American Uniform Sales Act).
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mained subject to the common law.138 Attempting to develop a
comprehensive statute to govern commercial contracts, the ALI
and the NCCUSL produced a draft U.C.C. in 1952, replacing the
USA and broadening its previous coverage to include general
contracts for the sale of goods. 39 The ALI and NCCUSL pro-
duced a revised draft in 1958,140 which, after various subsequent
revisions, has been enacted into law by all U.S. States.141 Each
State, however, has a modified version of the model U.C.C.
t4 2
b. The Provisions of Article 2 of the U.C.C.
Article 2 of the U.C.C. provides general rules governing
contracts for the sale of goods in the domestic context,143 includ-
ing: scope, 1 " application, 45 and validity of contracts.' 46 Article
2, which is divided into seven parts, 47 declares in Part 1 that it
applies to any transaction for the sale of goods'4 8 that bears a
reasonable relation to an individual state adopting the U.C.C.
149
Part 2 of Article 2 addresses the formal requirements of a con-
tract for the sale of goods,' including the formation of the con-
138. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing joint efforts of NC-
CUSL and ALI to deal with USA).
139. See CoNTRAcrS, supra note 130, at 42 (discussing approval of first official draft
of U.C.C.). See U.C.C. art. 2. (1994) (setting forth rules which governing contracts for
sale of goods).
140. See CoNTRActs, supra note 130, at 35.
141. Id. at 42. As of 1990, Louisiana had adopted only part of the U.C.C. Id.
142. See QUINN'S DIGEST, supra note 18, at 8 (providing state variations from offi-
cial text on provision-by-provision basis).
143. See supra note 20 (noting U.C.C. Art. 2 application only to contracts for sale of
goods).
144. U.C.C. § 2-102.
145. U.C.C. § 1-103 (providing general applicability of U.C.C.). See also U.C.C. § 2-
102 (providing scope and application of Article 2).
146. See U.C.C. §§ 1-206, 2-201, 2-204, 302 (discussing validity issues including
fraud (1-206 & 2-201), duress (2-204), and unconscionability (2-302)); WHITE & SUM-
MERS, supra note 18 (oudining basic content and analyzing case law.)
147. U.C.C. art. 2.
148. U.C.C. § 2-102. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing contents
of provision).
149. U.C.C. § 1-105(1). This provision states:
[W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state [i.e., a state of
the United States enacting the U.C.C.] and also to another state or nation the
parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or
nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act [i.e.,
the U.C.C.] applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
Id. (emphasis added).
150. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (discussing formal requirement of contract to be in writ-
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tract 51 and the recision 152 or modification 15 3 of the contract,
and the rights granted under the contract.1 5 4 Part 3 deals with
the general obligations of parties155 and the construction of con-
tracts. 56 Part 4 of Article 2 concerns passage of title under a
ing.) The statute of frauds encourages parties to put agreement in writing. Id. Cf
supra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining that contract of sale under C.I.S.G.
need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing). See supra note 109 and accompany-
ing text (permitting C.I.S.G. contracting state to require formalities pursuant to decla-
ration under Article 96). The United States did not make reservation under Article 96.
Id.
151. See U.C.C. § 2-202 through 2-210 (applying to formation of contract,including
evidence, seals, intent to show agreement, firm offers, offer and acceptance). Parol or
extrinsic evidence can be used to clarify or explain content of the agreement or the
usage of trade. Id. Seals are inoperative. Id. § 2-203. A contract is formed, even when
missing terms, or the moment of its making is undetermined, when it is made in any
manner sufficient to show an intent to agree, whether oral, written or otherwise. Id.
§ 2-204. Firm offers require a signed writing, however, and are open for a maximum of
three months if no time is stated. Id. § 2-205. The acceptance of an offer may be either
by prompt promise or prompt performance, unless the offeror has made clear that a
particular mode is preferred. Id. § 2-206. The offer may lapse if acceptance is not
within a reasonable time. Id. Varying terms in offer and acceptance may still result in a
contract. Id. § 2-207.
152. BLACK'S LAw DicrioNARY 905 (6th ed. 1991). Recission of Contract is defined
as:
To abrogate, annul, avoid, or cancel a contract; particularly, nullifying a
contract by the act of a party. The right of rescission is the right to cancel
(rescind) a contract upon the occurrence of certain kinds of default by the
other contracting party. To declare a contract void in its inception and to put
an end to it as though it never were. A "rescission" amounts to the unmaking
of a contract, or an undoing of it from the beginning, and not merely a termi-
nation, and it may be effected by mutual agreement of parties, or by one of
the parties declaring rescission of contract without consent of other if a legally
sufficient ground therefor exists, or by applying to courts for a decree of re-
scission. It necessarily involves a repudiation of the contract and a refusal of
the moving party to be further bound by it. Nonetheless, not every default in
a contract will give rise to a right of rescission....
Id.
153. BLACK'S Lw DICTONARY 695 (6th ed. 1991). Modification is defined as:
A change; an alteration or amendment which introduces new elements
into the details, or conceals some of them, but leaves the general purpose and
effect of the subject-matter intact.
Id.
154. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (governing rescission and modification of contract). The
obligations of the contract are assignable by each party unless such assignment would
materially alter the duty of the other party. Id. § 2-210.
155. See U.C.C. § 2-301 (providing that general obligation of seller is to transfer
and deliver and that of buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with contract.) See
supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (identifying obligations of buyer and seller
under C.I.S.G.).
156. See id. §§ 2-304 - 2-328 (providing terms of contract.) Sections 2-304 through
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contract for the sale of goods, 57 the rights of the seller's credi-
tors, 158 and the rights of good faith purchasers. 159 Part 5 deals
with the rights and obligations of parties in the performance of a
contract for the sale of goods.1 61 Part 6 governs the complex
issues of: breach,' 6 ' repudiation, 162 and excuse,1 63 while Part 7
2-310 supply general terms to a contract such as price, delivery and payment. Id. §§ 2-
304 - 2-310. Sections 2-312 through 2-318 supply terms concerning the quality of the
merchandise and express and implied warranties. Id. §§ 2-312 - 2-318. Sections 2-319
through 2-325 provide clarification of terms such as F.O.B. (freight on board), C.I.F.
(cost insurance freight). Id. §§ 2-319 - 2-325. Sections 2-326 through 2-328 address
special sale terms including: consignment sales, sale on approval and sale on return,
and sale by auction. Id. §§ 2-236 - 2-328.
157. Id. § 2-401. "This provision deals with the issues between seller and buyer in
terms of step by step performance or non-performance under the contract and not in
terms of whether or not 'title' to the goods has passed." Id. O.C. 1 (1994).
158. Id. § 2-402. Generally, buyer has the right to recover goods under Section 2-
402, as against the rights of unsecured creditors of the seller, with respect to goods
which have been identified to a contract for sale. Id. The creditor of the seller may
treat a sale or an identification of goods as void if seller is fraudulent under any rule of
law of the state where the goods are situated. Id. However, nothing in this section is
deemed to impair the rights of creditors of the seller. Id.
. 159. See id. § 2-403 (discussing power to transfer good title and interests trans-
ferred). This provision further concerns bailments and entrustment of possession of
goods with power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the ordinary course
of business. Id.
160. Id. §§ 2-501 - 2-515. Provisions 2-501 through 2-510 define the performance
required by the seller such as identification of goods, tender of delivery, cure by seller
for improper tender of delivery, risk of loss and the effect of breach on risk of loss. Id.
§§ 2-501 - 2-510. Sections 2-511 through 2-513 concern the performance tasks of the
buyer such as tender of payment, payment by buyer before inspection and buyer's right
to inspection of goods. Id. §§ 2-511 - 2-513. General performance obligations of buyer
and seller are found in sections 2-514, 2-515. Id. §§ 2-514, 2-515. Section 2-514 covers
document sales and states when documents are deliverable on acceptance and when on
payment. Id. § 2-514. Section 2-515 discusses preserving evidence of goods in dispute.
Id. § 2-515.
161. BLAcK's LEGAL DiCrIONARY 130 (6th ed. 1991). Breach is defined as:
The breaking or violating of a law, right, obligation, engagement, or duty,
either by commission or omission. Exists where one party to contract fails to
carry out term, promise, or condition of the contract.
Id. at 130.
162. Id. at 903. Repudiation is defined as:
A rejection, disclaimer, or renunciation of a contract before performance is
due that does not operate as an anticipatory breach unless the promisee elects
to treat the rejection as a breach and brings a suit for damages. The rejection
or refusal of an offered or available right or privilege, or of a duty or relation.
The act of a buyer or seller in rejecting a contract of sale either partially or
totally. U.C.C. §§ 2-610, 2-703, 2-708, 2-711.
Repudiation of a contract means refusal to perform duty or obligation
owed to other party. Such consists in such words or actions by contracting
party as indicate that he is not going to perform his contract in the future.
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covers the related questions of buyers'."' and sellers' 165 reme-
Repudiation of contract is in nature of anticipatory breach before per-
formance is due, but does not operate as anticipatory breach unless promisee
elects to treat repudiation as breach, and brings suit for damages. Such repu-
diation is but act or declaration in advance of any actual breach and consists
usually of absolute and unequivocal declaration or act amounting to declara-
tion on part of promisor to promisee that he will not make performance on
future day at which contract calls for performance.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) CoNTRAcTs §§ 318-321 (1932) (discussing repudia-
tion).
163. U.C.C. §§ 2-601 - 2-616. Section 2-601 discusses buyer's rights on improper
delivery. Id. § 2-601. Sections 2-602 through 2-604 discuss rightfully rejected goods.
Id. §§ 2-602 - 2-604. The buyer's right to object to goods may be waived for failure to
particularize. Id. § 2-605. Sections 2-606 and 2-607 cover what constitutes acceptance
of goods and the effect of acceptance. Id. §§ 2-602, 2-607. The buyer is entitled to
revoke acceptance of goods in whole or in part. Id. § 2-608. Each party has a right to
adequate assurance of the other party's performance. Id. at § 2-609. Of course, there
may be anticipatory repudiation, id. at § 2-610, and retraction of anticipatory repudia-
tion, id. § 2-611. In an installment contract, one which requires or authorizes the deliv-
ery of goods in separate lots to.be separately accepted, the buyer may reject any install-
ment which is non-conforming, but if the non-conformity does not substantially impair
the value of the whole contract, the seller may give adequate assurance of its cure, thus
the buyer must accept that installment Id. § 2-612. Several provisions take into ac-
count that there may be no fault on the part of either party. Id. §§ 2-613, 2-614. Other
provisions allow excuse. Id. §§ 2-615, 2-616. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed.
1991). Excuse is defined as:
A reason alleged for doing or not doing a thing. A matter alleged as a
reason for relief or exemption from some duty or obligation. That which is
offered as a reason for being excused, or a plea offered in extenuation of a
fault or irregular deportment. It is that plea or statement made by the accused
which arises out of the state of facts constituting and relied on as the cause.
Id.
164. U.C.C. §§ 2-711 - 2-717. Certain remedy provisions are applicable to the
buyer. See id. §§ 2-711 - 2-717 (discussing remedies in general, security interest in re-
jected goods, right to procure substitute goods). The buyer's damages may be for non-
delivery or repudiation or breach in regard to accepted good. Id. §§ 2-713, 2-714. Rem-
edies may include incidental and consequential damages. Id. § 2-715. Buyer may also
have a right to specific performance and deduction of damages from the price. Id.
§§ 2-716, 2-717. Certain provisions concerning remedies are applicable to both the
seller and the buyer. Id. §§ 2-718 - 2-725. The valuation provisions requiring proof of
market price, and admissibility of market quotations are located in U.C.C. §§ 2-723, 2-
724.
165. U.C.C. §§ 2-702 - 2-710. Certain remedy provisions are applicable to the
seller. See id. §§ 2-702 - 2-710 (discussing seller's remedies in general, right to salvage
unfinished goods, right to stop delivery in transit, right to resell, damages, non-accept-
ance or repudiation). The seller's remedies may include action for the price and inci-
dental damages. Id. §§ 2-709, 2-710. Certain provisions concerning remedies are appli-
cable to both the seller and the buyer. See id. §§ 2-718 - 2-725 (discussing liquidation of
damages, contractual modification or limitation of remedy, effect of cancellation or
rescission on claims for antecedent breach, remedies for fraud, suit of third parties for
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dies. 166
B. The ICLAIC and the O.A.S.
The ICLAIC resulted from the Fifth Inter-American Special-
ized Conference of the O.A.S. 1 67 Throughout the 1970's and
injuries to goods.) The valuation provisions requiring proof of market price, and ad-
missibility of market quotations are located in U.C.C. §§ 2-723, 2-724. The statute of
limitations in contracts for sale is four years after the cause of action has accrued. Id.
§ 2-725.
166. See id. § 2-701 (providing remedies with respect to obligations "collateral or
ancillary" to contract not impaired by specific provisions of U.C.C.). BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 896 (6th ed. 1991). Remedy is defined as:
The means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is pre-
vented, redressed, or compensated. The means employed to enforce a right
or redress an injury, as distinguished from right, which is a well founded or
acknowledged claim.
The rights given to a party by law or by contract which that party may
exercise upon a default by the other contracting party, or upon the commis-
sion of a wrong (a tort) by another party.
Remedy means any remedial right to which an aggrieved party is entitled
with or without resort to a tribunal. "Rights" includes remedies. U.C.C. § 1-
201.
Id.
167. Interview with Jeannette Trambel, Organization of American States Legal Of-
ficer, Department of Development and Codification of International Law, Secretariat
for Legal Affairs, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Interview]. Proceed-
ings for the first four "CIDIP" (which stands for Conferencia Especializada Interameri-
cana Sobre Derecho Internacional Privado), have been published in Spanish only, and
may be referenced by the following citations:
CIDIP-I: Actas Y Documentos:
- Volume I: Antecedentes, actas de las sesiones plenarias, informes de los
relatores, acta final y convenciones aprobads por la CIDIP.
OEA/Ser.K/XXXI.1, CIDIP/64 (22 mayo 1975)
- Volume II: Actas de las sesiones de las Comisiones I y II y proyectos presentados
a esa comisiones.
OEA/Ser.K/XXI.1, CIDIP/64 (22 mayo 1975)
CIDIP-II: Actas Y Documentos:
- Volume I: Antecedentes, actas de las sesiones plenarias, informes des los
relatores, acta final y convenciones aprobads por la CIDIP-II y lista
de participantes.
OEA/Ser.K/XX1.2, CIDIP-II/103 (22 enero 1980)
- Volume II: Actas de la Comision I
OEA/Ser.K/XX1.2, CIDIP-II/103 (22 enero 1980)
- Volume III: Actas de la Comision II
OEA/Ser.K/XX1.2, CIDIP-I/103 (22 enero 1980)
CIDIP-III: Actas Y Documentos:
- Volume I: Antecedentes, actas de las sesiones plenarias, informes des los
relatores y otros documentos.
OEA/Ser.K/XX1.3, CIDIP-III/69 (30 marzo 1989)
- Volume II: Actas de la Comision I
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1980's, O.A.S. Members made numerous legislative attempts to
harmonize choice-of-law rules within the O.A.S. community.168
These efforts led to the development of the ICLAIC, 6 9 which
addresses choice-of-law problems in relation to international
contracts. 170 The ICLAIC, adopted at a diplomatic conference
convened in Mexico City in 1994,171 was signed by four O.A.S.
Member States: Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela.172 The
ICLAIC's provisions aim to unify private international law.'
73
1. Legislative History of the ICLAIC
In the years 1975, 1979, 1984, and 1989, respectively, the
General Assembly of the O.A.S. convoked the first, 174 second,1
75
OEA/Ser.K/XX1.3, CIDIP-III/69 (30 marzo 1989)
- Volume III: Actas de la Comision II
OEA/Ser.K/XX1.3, CIDIP-III/69 (30 marzo 1989)
CIDIP-LV: Actas Y Documentos:
-Volume I: Antecedentes, actas de las sesiones plenarias, informes des los
relatores y otros documentos.
OEA/Ser.K/XX1.4, CIDIP-IV/103 (28 febrero 1991)
- Volume II: Actas de la Comision I
OEA/Ser.K/XX1.4, CIDIP-IV/103 (28 febrero 1991)
In respect of the proceedings for CIDIP-V, these are presently in progress.
Id.
168. See Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Bills of Ex-
change, Promissory Notes and Invoices reprinted in 14 I.L.M. at 332; Inter-American
Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Checks, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. at 334; Inter-
American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Checks, reprinted in 18 I.L.M.
1212; Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Commercial Compa-
nies, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1222. Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws con-
cerning the Adoption of Minors, reprinted in 24 IL.M. 460.
169. The ICLAIC, supra note 2, pmbl., at 733.
170. Cf UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 47-48 (discussing C.I.S.G.'s basic rules on
applicability, internationality and transaction's relation to contracting state.)
171. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing efforts at specialized con-
ference to develop uniform choice-of-law rules).
172. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (introducing ICLAIC and indicating
its adoption by Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela).
173. Cf UNIFORM Law, supra note 8, at 47 (providing brief introduction to
C.I.S.G.'s uniform principle).
174. See First Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law,
reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 325 (1975) (Introductory Note and Conference Text) [hereinafter
CIDIP-I]; Peter H. Pfund, United States Participation in International Unification of Private
Law, 19 INT'L Lw. 505, 506-07, 511 (1985) [hereinafter Pfund I] (discussing U.S. par-
ticipation in First Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International
Law); Lucinda A. Low, International Judicial Assistance Among the American States: The In-
ter-American Conventions, 18 INT'L Law. 705 705-14 (1984).
175. See Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International
Law, reprinted in 18 1L.M. 1211 (1979) (Introductory Note and Conference Text) [here-
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third,176 and fourth1 7 Inter-American Conferences on Private
International Law.178 The first Inter-American Conference on
Private International Law produced a set of conventions regard-
ing: the use of powers of attorney extraterritorially,"19 the taking
of evidence abroad, 180 and conflict of laws principles governing
bills of exchange,181 promissory notes,182 and invoices.183  This
conference also discussed conflict of laws provisions governing
inafter CIDIP-II]; Pfund I, supra note 174, at 506-07 (discussing U.S. participation in
Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law).
176. See Third Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International
Law, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 459 (1985) (Introductory Note and Conference Text) [here-
inafter CIDIP-III]; Pfund I, supra note 174, at 506-14 (discussing U.S. participation in
Third Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law).
177. See Fourth Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International
Law, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 62 (1990) (Introductory Note and Conference Text) [herein-
after CIDIP-IV]; Pfund I, supra note 174.
178. Interview, supra note 167 (discussing telephone conversation with OAS.
Legal Office).
179. Inter-American Convention on the Legal Regime of Powers of Attorney to be
Used Abroad, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. at 326.
180. Inter-American Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad, reprinted in 14 I.L.M.
at 328.
181. BLACK's LAw DIcrIoNARY 113 (6th ed. 1991). Bills of Exchange are defined
as:
An unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to another,
signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to
pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in
money. A three party instrument in which first party draws an order for the
payment of a sum certain on a second party for payment to a third party at a
definite future time. Same as "draft" under U.C.C. A check is a demand bill
of exchange.
Id.
182. Id. at 113. A promissory note is:
A promise or engagement, in writing, to pay a specified sum at a time
therein stated, or on demand, or at sight, to a person therein named, or to his
order, or bearer. An unconditional written promise, signed by the maker, to
pay absolutely and at all events a sum certain in money, either to the bearer or
to a person therein designated or his order, at a time specified therein, or at a
time which must certainly arrive.
A signed paper promising to pay another a certain sum of money. An
unconditional written promise to pay a specified sum of money on demand or
at a specified date. Such a note is negotiable if signed by the maker and con-
taining an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money either on
demand or at a definite time and payable to order or bearer. U.C.C. § 3-104.
Id.
183. Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Bills of Ex-
change, Promissory Notes and Invoices reprinted in 14 I.L.M. at 332.
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checks,1 8 4 international commercial arbitration,"8 5 and letters ro-
gatory.18 6 Twelve countries, excluding the United States, signed
each of the conventions in January 1975.187 The United States
has begun the process of reviewing'88 and ratifying8 9 these
O.A.S. conventions on a selective basis.' 90
The second conference, which took place in 1979, con-
cerned such matters as: conflict-of-law principles governing
checks, 1 ' conflict of laws principles governing commercial com-
panies,1 92 the extraterritorial validity of foreign judgment and ar-
bitral awards, 9 ' execution of preventive measures,19 4 the use of
foreign law in litigation, 95 and the rules governing domicile of
natural persons in private international law.' 9 6 This second set of
conventions also included a convention identifying general rules
184. Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Checks, eprinted
in 14 I.L.M. at 334.
185. Inter-American Convention Concerning International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. at 336. This convention has since been ratified by the United
States. See Peter H. Pfund, Overview of the Codification Process, 15 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L. 7,
18 (1989) [hereinafter Pfund II] (discussing the Inter-American Convention Concern-
ing International Commercial Arbitration ("CICA")).
186. Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. at 339.
This convention has since been ratified by the United States. See Peter H. Pfund, Inter-
national Unification of Private Law: A Report on US. Participation - 1987-88, 22 INT'L
LAw. 1157, 1160 (1988) [hereinafter Pfund III] (discussing the Inter-American Conven-
tion on Letters Rogatory ("CLR")).
187. CIDIP-I, supra note 174, at 325. The countries signing each of the conven-
tions are: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. Peru signed all conventions
except the International Commercial Arbitration. Id.
188. See id. at 511 (discussing pending action on CIDIP-I conventions).
189. See Pfund II, supra note 185, at 18 (noting ratification of CIDIP-I arbitration
convention); Pfund III, supra note 186, at 1160 (noting ratification of CIDIP-I letters
rogatory convention).
190. See Interview, supra note 167 (discussing telephone conversation with OAS
Legal Department).
191. Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Checks, reprinted
in 18 I.L.M. 1220.
192. Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Commercial
Companies, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1222.
193. Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments
and Arbitral Awards, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1224.
194. Inter-American Convention on Execution of Preventive Measures, reprinted in
18 I.L.M. 1227.
195. Inter-American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law,
reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1231.
196. Inter-American Convention on Domicile of Natural Persons in Private Inter-
national Law, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1234.
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of private international law197 and produced an additional proto-
col to the 1975 convention on letters rogatory.198
The third Inter-American Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law, held in 1984,199 resulted in three conventions,200 as
well as an additional protocol to the 1975 convention on the tak-
ing of evidence abroad.20 1 Eighteen Member States of the
O.A.S. were represented, including the United States.202 Eleven
of these Member State delegates had full powers to sign conven-
tions adopted by the conference.20 3
The fourth conference,0 4 held in 1989, like the third, re-
sulted in the approval of three more conventions.20 5 These con-
ventions included: the Inter-American Convention on the Inter-
national Return of Children, 20 6 the Inter-American Convention
on Support Obligations,2 0 7 and the Inter-American Convention
on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods by Road. 0 8
The ICLAIC resulted from the Fifth Inter-American Confer-
ence on Private International Law, held in Mexico City in March
197. Inter-American Convention on General Rules of Private International Law,
reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1236.
198. Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory,
reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1238. The protocol has been ratified by the United States. See
Pfund III, supra note 186, at 1160 (noting ratification of the protocol).
199. CIDIP-1I, supra note 176, 24 I.L.M. at 171.
200. See Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws concerning the Adoption
of Minors, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 460; Inter-American Convention on Personality and
Capacity of Juridical Persons in Private International Law, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 465;
Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extra-
territorial Validity of Foreign Judgments, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 468.
201. See Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 472.
202. See CIDIP-III, supra note 176, intro., 24 I.L.M. at 459.
203. Id. Eleven member states signed three specialized conventions from the third
conference. Id. They are: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Id. These states each signed
all of the CIDIP-III conventions, with certain exceptions. Id. Nicaragua and Peru did
not sign the Convention on the Adoption of Minors. Id. The Dominican Republic and
Peru did not sign the Convention on Personality and Capacity. Id. Haiti did not sign
the Additional Protocol. Id.
204. CIDIP-IV, supra note 177, 29 I.L.M. 62.
205. Id.
206. Inter-American Convention on the International Return of Children, reprinted
in 29 I.L.M. 63.
207. Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 73.
208. Inter-American Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of
Goods by Road, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 81.
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1994.209 The conference produced two conventions: the
ICLAIC and a convention on international traffic in minors.21 °
The ICLAIC represented an international initiative to unify and
harmonize international contract law. 11
The ICLAIC addresses three situations that may necessitate
the application of choice-of-law rules to contracts.2 12 The first
situation involves "international" contracts213 where the intro-
209. The ICLAIC, supra note 2, 33 I.L.M. 732.
210. Inter-American Convention on International Traffic in Minors, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 721 (1994).
211. The ICLAIC, supra note 2, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 732.
212. Diamond, supra note 3, at 249.
213. Id. The word "international" is in quotation marks because it lacks precise
meaning. Id. Diamond gives several examples where the term is deliberate but not
defined. Id.
First, the 1955 Sales Convention Article 1, Paragraph 1 states that 'This Conven-
tion applies to international sales of goods.' The convention contains no defi-
nition of 'international.' The 1955 Sales Convention Paragraph 4 of Article 1
does state that 'The mere declaration of the parties relating to the applicabil-
ity of a law or to the jurisdiction of ajudge or arbitrator is not sufficient to give
a sale the international character provided for in the first paragraph of this
Article.'
Id. at 248.
Second, the 1978 Agency Convention Article 1, Paragraph 1 provides that
'The present Convention determines the law applicable to relationships of an
international character arising where a person, the agent, has the authority to
act, acts or purports to act on behalf of another person, the principal, in deal-
ing with a third party.'
Id. at 248-49. Here also the word "international" is not defined. Id.
Third, the 1985 Sales Convention entitled 'Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.' The word 'international' is
not used in the text of the convention itself. Article 1 reads as follows:
'This Convention determines the law applicable to contracts of sale of goods -
(a) between parties having their places of business in different States;
(b) in all other cases involving a choice between the laws of different States,
unless such a choice arises solely from a stipulation by the parties as to the
applicable law, even if accompanies by a choice of court or arbitration.'
Id. at 249.
Fourth, the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) which provides that 'This Convention applies to contracts of sale of
goods between parties whose place of business are in different States.' Article 1
goes on to say in paragraph (3) that 'Neither the nationality of the parties nor
the civil or commercial character of the parties or of the contract is to be
taken into consideration in determining the application of this Convention.'
Id. Here again, international is not defined. Id.
If the parties to a contract are domiciled in a different country from that in
which it is made, or if it is to be performed in a different country from that in
which the parties reside or carry on business, or if the subject-matter of the
contract is to move from country to country, as where goods in one country
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duction of a foreign element may give rise to a question of
choice of law.2 14 The second situation involves litigation taking
place in a foreign court.215 The third situation concerns con-
tracting parties who have included a choice-of-law clause in their
contract 216 that may or may not be valid.2 17
The ICLAIC addresses these problems through three basic
features that are typical in conventions dealing with matters of
private international law in relation to contracts.218 First, the
convention provides choice-of-law rules in the absence of choice
by the parties themselves. 9 Second, the convention provides
for the application of the suitable law to particular types of con-
tracts, followed by rules of a general nature applicable to most
types of contracts. 220 Third, the convention expressly provides
parties the freedom to choose the law that is to govern their con-
tractual relationship.2 2 1
2. Provisions of the ICLAIC
The ICLAIC determines the applicable law222 governing
are to be delivered in another, one make by lead to the conclusion that we are
dealing with an international contract rather than a contract related solely to
one country, which We may regard as a 'domestic' contract.
Id. at 252.
Fifth, the Rome Convention, which in Article 1(1) states that '[t]he rules of this
Convention shall apply to contractual obligations in any situation involving a
choice between the laws of different countries.'
Id. at 249.
This broad approach taken by the Rome Convention is not limited to interna-
tional situations states A.L. Diamond in his article. The reference to 'a choice'
is clearly intended to be to a choice by a court rather than by the parties,
because one could perhaps argue that every contract involves the possibility of
incorporating a choice of law clause so that the non-incorporation of such a
clause is itself a choice; the actual incorporation of a choice of law clause will
attract the Conventions's rules and, no doubt, a choice made by the parties
after the contract has been made.
Id. at 250.
214. Id. at 248.
215. Id. at 250.
216. Id. at 253. The contract may contain a choice-of-law clause such as "This con-
tract shall be governed by the law of [the United States]." Id.
217. Id. at 251.




222. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 1, 53 I.L.M. at 733. The applicable law under the
convention may be the law of a nonparty state. Id. art. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 733. For purposes
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parties223  to international 24 commercial225 contracts in gen-
eral. 26 The ICLAIC conferees intended the provisions of the
of the ICLAIC, "law" is defined to mean "the law current in a State, excluding rules
concerning conflict of laws." Id. art. 17, 33 I.L.M. at 736. See id. arts. 22-24, 33 I.L.M. at
737-38 (discussing ICLAIC rules with respect to states with more than one system of law
applicable in different territorial units).
Generally, the term "applicable law" denotes the law which controls or governs
the contract, the law under which the contract has legal effect (or does not
have legal effect, as the case may be). Often it will govern questions such as
the interpretation of the contract and performance of the contract, though
often a convention or legislation will specifically state exactly what it is that the
applicable law governs. That is to say the scope of the convention.
Diamond, supra note 3, at 254.
223. See ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 1, 33 IL.M. 733 (concerning scope of applica-
tion between parties). The convention would be applicable to contracts with "States or
State agencies or entities." Id. It is also applicable to "persons." Id. art. 13, 33 I.L.M. at
736 (referring to "persons" in different states). At the time of signing, ratification, or
accession, a State party to the ICLAIC may declare that the convention does not apply
to any or certain categories of contracts with the state or its agencies and entities. Id.
art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 733. See id. arts. 21, 24, 26-28, 33 I.L.M. at 737-38 (concerning sign-
ing, ratification, and accession rules.)
224. Id. art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 733. Article 1 provides that "a contract is international
if the parties thereto have their habitual residence or establishments in different States
Parties or if the.contract has objective ties with more than one State Party." Id. (emphasis
added); cf. id. art. 13, 33 I.L.M. at 736 (providing for validity of contracts between par-
ties in same state under specified circumstances). Thus, unlike the situation under the
C.I.S.G., under the ICLAIC parties can be located in the same state without defeating
the "internationality" of their contract. Id. art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 733. Jurisdictional appli-
cability of the ICLAIC in this regard is similar to that found in the U.C.C. Compare id.
(discussing ICLAIC applicability where there are "objective ties with [a] State Party")
with U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (determining U.C.C. applicability where there is "reasonable re-
lation" or "appropriate relation" with U.C.C. state). See supra note 149 and accompany-
ing text (discussing U.C.C. § 1-105(1)).
225. See ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 5, 33 I.L.M. at 734 (stating expressly that
ICLAIC does not determine law applicable to marital status or capacity of parties). The
ICLAIC does not determine the law applicable to successional or testamentary ques-
tions, marital arrangements or family arrangements. Id. It does not determine the law
applicable to obligations deriving from securities or securities transactions. Id. It does
not determine the law applicable to agreements of parties concerning arbitration or
selection of a forum. Id. It does not determine the law applicable to questions of com-
pany law and juridical persons in general. Id. Furthermore, the convention does not
apply to contracts that have autonomous regulations in international conventional law
in force among the State Parties to the convention. Id. art. 6, 33 I.L.M. at 734.
226. Id. art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 733. As to any state party, the provisions of the ICLAIC
only apply prospectively, to contracts concluded after the convention enters into force
in that state. Id. art. 19, 33 I.L.M. at 737. At ratification or accession, a State Party may
declare that the convention does not apply to certain categories of contract. Id. art. 1,
33 I.L.M. at 733. The ICIAIC also permits reservations with respect to specific provi-
sions of the convention "not incompatible with the effect and purpose of this Conven-
tion." Id. art. 21, 33 I.L.M. at 737.
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convention to apply to new modalities of contracts22 7 that arose
as a consequence of the development of international trade.228
Signatories interpret and apply the ICLAIC in a manner that
takes into account: (1) its international character, 2 9 and (2) the
need to promote uniformity.230 A contract under the ICLAIC is
deemed international if the parties reside in or are organized
under the laws of different States, or if the contract has objective
ties with more than one State Party.2
3 1
The provisions of Chapter Two of the ICLAIC, which deter-
mine the applicable law governing a contract subject to the
ICLAIC, 32 expressly provide freedom for the parties to choose
the law that is to govern their contractual relationship.233 The
227. Id. art. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 734. Article 3 provides that the convention applies the
term "to new modalities of contract." Id. But cf. Babbit Electronics, Inc. v. Dynascan
Corp., 38 F.3d. 1161, 1169-70 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing effects of Venezuelan regula-
tion of intellectual property contracts "whatever the modalities").
228. ICIAIC, supra note 2, art. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 734. The ICLAIC's explicit insis-
tence that the "modality" or form of a contract does not affect the applicability of the
convention is the functional equivalent of the U.C.C. provision ensuring that "[a] con-
tract may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement." U.C.C. § 2-204(1); cf.
U.C.C. § 2-201, O.C. 1 (discussing writing requirement for certain contracts does not
entail any particular formality to be valid). This approach is significant in the interna-
tional business context, where informalities and trade practices which are subject to
rapid change and evolution are far more common. QUINN'S DIGEsr, supra note 18, at
79. In this regard, commentators have noted:
The law must meet the particular needs of parties that deal with each other at
a distance, often without an ongoing relationship that might provide a history
of cooperation and a stake in the future. At the same time, the law must cope
with the information-based culture that is reshaping the world economy.
[I]nternational sales of goods tend to have distinctive aspects: because the law
of more than one country might apply, the fact of commitment and the mean-
ing of the agreed terms have to be especially free of ambiguity.
PAUL B. STEPHAN ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 609 (1993).
229. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 734. See supra note 86 and accompa-
nying text (discussing international character of the C.I.S.G. as principle of interpreta-
tion.) See also supra note 224 (discussing "internationality" under ICIAIC.)
230. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 734. See supra note 87 and accompa-
nying text (discussing uniformity as principle of interpretation under C.I.S.G.).
231. See ICLAIC supra note 2, art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 733. "It shall be understood that a
contract is international if the parties thereto have their habitual residence or establish-
ments in different States Parties or if the contract has objective ties with more than one
State Party." Id.
232. ICLAIC, supra note 2, arts. 7-11, 33 I.L.M. at 734-35.
233. Id. art. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 734. The parties' agreement in this regard must be
express or evident from their behavior and the provisions of the contract considered as
a whole. Id. The ICLAIC specifically provides that a choice-of-forum clause "does not
necessarily entail" choice of law. Id.; see George Kahale, III, Does a Choice-of-Law Clause
Waive Immunity?, Ir'L FIN. L. Rav., July 1988, at 28 (discussing interrelationship of
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parties are permitted to modify their choice of law, in whole or
in part, at any time." 4 This provision, however, is contrary to
the C.I.S.G., which precludes post-contractual modification. 33
In the ICLAIC, if the parties do not select the law applicable
to the contract, the law of the state with which the contract has
the closest ties will govern.3 6 The ICLAIC provides connecting
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses). Diamond, supra note 3, at 254 (noting free-
dom to choose applicable law as remarkably unanimous among international conven-
tions); C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 6, 33 I.L.M. at 673 (providing freedom to derogate
from or vary effect of any of C.I.S.G. provisions).
Since the law of contract is the medium which in every legal system enables
parties to determine the nature of the legal relationship between them, de-
limit the obligations, to impose obligations, to say what those obligations are,
in what circumstances they should operate, in what circumstances there
should be relief from those obligations, and since the law of contract rests on
agreement, it is not surprising that the freedom to make your own contract,
which exists in a greater or lesser extent in every legal system, should include
the freedom to determine the law applicable to the contract.
Diamond, supra note 3, at 256.
234. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 8, 33 I.L.M. at 735. Modification of the choice of
law can be made at any time but such modification will not affect the formal validity of
the original contract or third-party rights. Id.; see id. art. 12-13, 33 I.L.M. at 735-736
(discussing ICLAIC rules for validity of contract.) C.I.S.G., supra note 17, arL 9, 19
I.L.M. at 674 (discussing flexibility of parties to allow trade practices and usage to apply
to their contract which the parties knew or should have known during formation of
contract). Article 9 provides:
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by
any practices which they have established between themselves.
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agree, to have impliedly
made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties
knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely
known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved
in the particular trade concerned.
Id.
235. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text (discussing Part III of C.I.S.G.
which includes modification or termination provisions under contract). See supra note
154 and accompanying text (discussing U.C.C. protection of modifications after con-
tract has been formed).
236. ICIAIC, supra note 2, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 735. In determining which state has
the closest ties with the contract, the ICIAIC requires a court to "take into account all
objective and subjective elements of the contract." Id. Separable parts of a contract
may have closer ties to different states, so that the law of those states would apply respec-
tively to the different parts of the contract. Id. The court must also take into account
"the general principles of international commercial law recognized by international or-
ganizations." Id.; see id. art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735 (guidelines, customs, principles of
international commercial law and generally accepted commercial usage and practice to
be applied to contract); C.I.S.G., supra note 17, arts. 1 (1), art 10, 19 I.L.M. at 672, 674
(determining C.I.S.G. applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places
of business are in different States). If a party has more than one place of business, the
place of business is that which has closest relationship to the contract and its perform-
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factors and general principles as formulae for the determination
of the closest tie inquiry.3 7 In the interests ofjustice and equity,
the guidelines, customs, principles of international commercial
law and generally accepted commercial usage and practice may
be applicable to the contract.2 38 Mandatory requirements 39 of
ance, having regard to the circumstances known to or contemplated by the parties at
any time before or at the conclusion of the contract; if a party does not have a place of
business, reference is to be made to his habitual residence. Id.; see supra note 149 and
accompanying text (discussing that U.C.C. applies to any transaction if it "bears a rea-
sonable relationship" to contracting state).
237. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
238. Id. art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 7(2), 19 I.L.M. at 673
(discussing generally accepted practices of C.I.S.G.); U.C.C. § 1-102 (discussing gener-
ally accepted practices under U.C.C.).
239. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 735. Diamond, supra note 3, at 288-
91.
What is meant by the term mandatory rules may range over a very wide area.
Some mandatory rules relate to contracts generally such as formal require-
ments for the making or evidencing of contracts. Another class of mandatory
rules may be found in rules that are imposed as part of the criminal law such
as where the contracts performance would involve the commission of a crimi-
nal offense. Additionally, there are mandatory rules of public order which
whether they are regarded as rules of constitutional law, administrative law, or
other rules of a regulatory nature, they cannot be varied by contract. Finally,
there are rules of the law of tort or delict which may be of a mandatory nature,
but they are not necessarily so.
Id.
See U.C.C. § 2-302 (setting forth U.C.C. rules on unconscionability). This provision
states:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id. § 2-302(1); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1995) (providing mandatory
rules governing U.S. district court jurisdiction over actions against public policy). Ex-
amples of such "mandatory requirements" might include forum state provisions con-
cerning public policy principles directed to the forum court itself, such as unconsciona-
bility or jurisdictional rules, such as those governing foreign sovereign immunity; see
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (upholding application of
exception to state's immunity from suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1330, 1605(a) (2) in action
concerning contract for sale of bonds); De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770
F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding central bank immune from suit under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330 in action concerning deposit contract); Callejo v. Bacomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101
(5th Cir. 1985) (holding state to be subject to suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1330, 1605(a) (2)
in action involving deposit contract). See ALAN C. SWAN &JOHN F. MURPHYv, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS
865-66, 882-87 (1991) (discussing -history of foreign sovereign immunity under U.S.
law); Avi Lew, Note, Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.: Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act's Commercial Activity Exception toJurisdiction Immunity, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
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forum state law nevertheless apply to the contract.24  The
ICLAIC allows the forum court to decide which nation's rules to
apply, and whether to apply mandatory provisions of the law of
another state or the forum state with which the contract has
close ties. 4  :
In contrast to the C.I.S.G., which expressly indicates that it
is not concerned with the validity of an international contract
subject to its provisions,2 42 chapter three of the ICLAIC provides
validity provisions.24 s The ICLAIC provisions concerning exist-
726 (1994) (discussing Republic of Argentina). See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (concerning
statutes of limitation for actions involving contracts of sale). But see ICLAIC, supra note
2, art. 14, 33 I.L.M. at 736 (providing applicable law under convention governs "pre-
scription and lapsing of actions").
240. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
241. Id.; see supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing concept of "close
ties" for purposes of applicable law).
242. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 4(a), 19 I.L.M. at 673.
243. ICLAIC, supra note 2, arts. 12-13, 33 I.L.M. at 735-36. Several problems arise
in international conventions regarding the "existence and validity" of a contract. Dia-
mond, supra note 3, at 305-08. Validity itself may involve either "material validity" or
"formal validity." Id.
On the point of material validity, the issue is which law is to determine
whether a contract is, apart from requirements of form, a valid contract. The
answer is that this is usually regarded as a matter to be determined by the
applicable law. But there may be a problem in determining the applicable law
where there is a choice of law clause. If the applicable law arises from the
rules to be applied in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, it will
normally be possible to decide on the law without worrying whether the con-
tract is valid or invalid. But where there is a choice of law clause, questions
may arise as to the validity of the choice itself. Has there been true consent?
Was the contract entered into as a result of fraud or misrepresentation? Was
the contract entered into as a result of a mistake, in which case under some
legal systems one must conclude that there was no contract at all. What law
decides whether there was consent to a choice of law? Can one refer this to
the applicable law, since there would be no applicable law if the choice was
not valid? There are those conventions that deal with this classic conundrum
of private international law do so by cutting the [Gordian] knot. Thus Article
8 (1) of the Rome Convention provides that: "The existence and validity of a
contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which
would govern it under this Convention if the contract or term were valid." The
words "any term of a contract" would of course include a choice of law
clause... The Rome solution has the advantage that if the "chosen" law finds
that the choice is valid one cannot then have the embarrassment of a conflict
as to the validity of the choice; if one decided the validity of the choice by
another law, such as the law of the forum, and concluded that the choice was
valid, one would then be led on to apply the chosen law, and might find that
the law took the view that the choice was invalid.
Id. at 305-08. On the issue of formal validity,
The trend in modem times is to try to prevent the striking down of contracts
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ence and validity require adherence to the appropriate rules in
accordance with Chapter Two of the ICLAIC,244 which indicates
whose law will govern the contract.2 45 In essence, the ICLAIC
provisions governing the validity of a contract are choice-of-law
rules, rather than substantive rules concerning the legality of
contract provisions.246
Chapter Four of the ICLAIC identifies the substantive law
issues that are governed by the law determined to be applicable
to the contract.247 As a general matter, the law248 of the forum
court is deemed to govern the interpretation of the contract,
2 49
for lack of formal requirements by offering alternative laws where possible;
this copes with parties who were ill-advised or made a mistake as to the law
which specifies formal needs. Thus under Article 9 (2) of the Rome Conven-
tion, a contract made between persons in different countries is formally valid
if it complies with the requirements of form of the applicable law or of anyone
of the countries where the parties are. If the parties are in the same country, it
may by Article 9(1) meet the requirements of the applicable law or of the
country where the parties are.
Id. at 308. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 12, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
Article 12 of the ICLAIC on "existence and validity" of the contract looks to "appli-
cable law". Id. The article states that such concerns shall be governed by the appropri-
ate rules in accordance with Chapter 2 of the ICLAIC, which provides that the contract
shall be governed by the law agreed to by the parties. Id. In the absence of choice, or if
the selection proves ineffective, the contract is governed by the law of the State with
which it has the closest ties. Id. In addition general guidelines, customs, and principles
of international commercial usage and practices shall apply in order to discharge the
requirements of justice and equity in the particular case. Id. The parties may at any
time be subject to a law other than that to which it was previously subject. Id. That
modification shall not affect the formal validity of the original contract. See supra note
220 and accompanying text (discussing applicable law). Article 12 allows great defer-
ence to the judge who determines the applicable law, taking into account the habitual
residence or principal place of business. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 12, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
The convention does not provide guidance as to whose habitual residence or principal
place of business, buyer or seller, and in what cases. Id. This appears to be a wide
escape clause, giving a judge an almost unfettered discretion. See supra note 236 and
accompanying text (discussing closest ties).
244. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art 12, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
245. Id. art. 13, 33 I.L.M. at 736.
246. See id. art. 17, 33 I.L.M. at 736 (providing that substantive "law" applied under
convention is current law of state, except for conflict of laws principles).
247. Id. arts. 14-18, 33 I.L.M. at 736-37.
248. See id. art. 17, 33 I.L.M. at 736 (defining "law" to mean current law of state,
"excluding rules concerning conflict of laws"). See supra note 220 and accompanying
text (discussing applicable law).
249. Id. art. 14, 33 I.L.M. at 736. The ICLAIC follows the text of the Rome Conven-
tion Article 14 which reads:
1) The law applicable to the contract in virtue of Articles of this Convention
shall govern in particular:
a) interpretation;
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the rights and obligations of the patties,25 ° the prescription,251
b) performance;
c) within the limits of the powers conferred on the court by its procedural
law, the consequences of breach, including the assessment of damages in so
far as it is governed by rules of law;
d) the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescriptions and limita-
tion of actions;
e) the consequences of nullity of the contract.
2) In relation to the manner of performance and the steps to be taken in
event of defective performance regard shall be had to the law of the country in
which performance takes place.
Rome Convention, supra note 5, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2, OJ. L 266/1 (1980).
Since the Rome Convention is not officially subordinate to the E.C. Treaty, the
European Court ofJustice is not automatically empowered with jurisdiction to
interpret its provisions, as is the case under the 1968 Brussels Convention.
Thus, instead of a unified body giving a single interpretation, Member States
are able to construe the Convention as their judges see fit. This poses great
problem for the Convention because '[i]f cross-fertilization of judicial deci-
sion does not happen in the Community... the hope for unification of law
suggested by the attempt to write a conflict of laws convention will be unful-
filled.
Paradigm, supra note 5, at 190.
Article 18 attempts to confront and remedy this situation. It states: 'In the
interpretation and application of the preceding uniform rules, regard shall be
had to their international character and to the desirability of achieving uni-
formity in their interpretation and application.' Article 18 acknowledges the
Conventions's inability to attain uniformity without an autonomous E.CJ. ju-
risdiction. Without a single judicial body to interpret its provisions, the Con-
vention must appeal to Member States to achieve a uniform interpretation on
their own. The implication, or perhaps hope, embedded in article 18 is that
Community courts will manifest greater deference to fellow Member State de-
cisions than they previously have. This view however, is unrealistic given the
immense discretion granted to forum judges.
Id.
A number of high ranking judicial officials have already stated their opposi-
tion to the Rome Convention. It has been criticized as 'unfortunate and un-
necessary.' It does not maintain the status quo but virtually invites such ma-
nipulation with its discretionary and indeterminate provisions.
Id. In this regard, reference to the international character of the ICLAIC as a principle
of interpretation of its provisions is similar to the principle under Rome Convention
and the C.I.S.G. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing international
character of C.I.S.G. as principle of interpretation). See also note 224 and accompany-
ing text (discussing international character of ICLAIC as principle of interpretation.)
The European Community has attempted to rectify this situation through a series
of protocols which take years to complete and though it is assumed they will eventually
be implemented they may not necessarily solve the jurisdictional problem. See generally
Paradigm, supra note 5 (discussing demise of Rome Convention).
250. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 14, 33 I.L.M. at 736. See supra notes 248-49 and
accompanying text (discussing law applicable to contract that governs interpretation,
performance, consequences of breach, damages, prescription, and consequences of
nullity of contract).
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and the lapsing of actions. 2  As to obligations, the applicable
law determines performance of obligations253 and the conse-
quences of nonperformance.I54
Chapter Four also includes certain specialized rules with re-
spect to the scope of the applicable law.255 The ICLAIC requires
that international commercial law and generally accepted princi-
ples256 be taken into account in determining the authority of an
agent2 57 to bind a principal. 251 In addition, in situations where a
state requires that international contracts be registered or pub-
251. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 14, 33 I.L.M. at 736. In this context, "prescription"
means "a peremptory and perpetual bar to every species of action, real or personal,
when [a] creditor has been silent for a certain time without urging his claim." Id.
252. Id. art. 14,. 33 I.L.M. at 736; see supra note 220 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing term "applicable law"). See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing
U.C.C. statute of limitations in contracts for sale as four years after cause of action has
accrued).
253. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art 14, 33 I.L.M. at 736. In this regard, the applicable
law.governs "the various ways in which the obligation can be performed." Id. art 14, 33
I.L.M. at 736. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing law governing
performance); see supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing applicable law).
254. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 14, 33 I.L.M. at 736. For these purposes, "conse-
quences of nonperformance" includes the "assessment of injury to the extent that this
may determine payment of compensation." Id.
255. Id. arts. 14-18, 33 I.L.M. at 736-37.
256. See id. art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735 (providing application of commercial law, us-
age and practice); see also supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing Article 10).
257. Id. BLACK's LAW DICrIoNARY 41 (6th ed. 1991). Agent is defined as:
A person authorized by another (principal) to act for or in place of him;
one intrusted with another's business. One who represents and acts for an-
other under the contract or relation of agency (q.v.). A business representa-
tive, whose function is to bring about, modify, affect, accept performance of,
or terminate contractual obligations between principal and third persons.
One who undertakes to transact some business, or to manage some affair, for
another, by the authority and on account of the latter, and to render an ac-
count of it. One who acts for or in place of another by authority from him; a
substitute, a deputy, appointed by principal with power to do the things which
principal may do. One who deals not only with things, as does a servant, but
with persons, using his own discretion as to means, and frequently establishing
contractual relations between his principal and third persons.
One authorized to transact all business of principal, or all of principal's
business of some particular kind, or all business at some particular place....
Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957 Main Vol.). An agent is defined as:
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation
of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.
(3) The one who is to act is the agent.
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957 Main Vol.)
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lished, the ICLAIC provides that the law of that state governs all
matters concerning publicity.2 59 Finally, the ICLAIC provides
that a forum may exclude application of the law designated by
the parties only if that law is manifestly contrary to the public
policy of the forum. 6 °
II. THE ICLIC'S OBJECTIVES AS SPECIFIED IN ITS
PREAMBLE AND PROVISIONS
The overall success of the ICLAIC depends on whether or
not it achieves its three principal objectives. 6' First, the ICLAIC
seeks to facilitate international contracts by developing and codi-
fying existing private international law principles. 62 The
ICLAIC thus embodies elements of the U.C.C., C.I.S.G., and the
law merchant.2 63 Second the ICLAIC aims to foster harmoniza-
259. Id. art. 16, 33 I.L.M. at 736.
260. Id. art. 18, 33 I.L.M. at 737. This provision of the ICLAIC reads: "Application
of the law designated by this Convention may only be excluded when it is manifestly
contrary to the public order of the forum." Id.
The Rome Convention has a similar public policy provision. Rome Convention,
supra note 5, art. 16, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2, O.J. L 266/1 (1980). Article 16 provides
that "[t] he application of a rule of the law of any country specified by this convention
may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy
("ordre public") or the forum." Id. Included in the European Community policy con-
siderations is "Community public policy." Paradigm, supra note 5, at 5. What constitutes
this public policy is a matter of discretion. Id. Some academics contend that the words
"manifestly incompatible" indicate that the rule is only applicable in unique circum-
stances. Id. The Convention fails to make this distinction, however, leaving the deter-
mination to forum judges. Id. Article i6 may undermine the certainty of other Con-
vention articles. Id. at 10. For example, a country may use Article 16 to justify its re-
fusal to apply Article 7 to compel Member States to place Community interest ahead of
their own short-term interests. Id.
Public policy of course does shape choice-of-law rules. Peter Hay, Flexibility versus
Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of Law; Reflections on Current European and United
States Conflicts Law, in 6 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES CouRs CoL-
LECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 258- 391, 380 (1992).
261. See Diamond supra note 3, at 248-53 (discussing introduction of new conven-
tions and importance of determining whether or not legislation achieves its ultimate
objective).
262. ICLAIC, supra note 2, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 733.
263. See, e.g., ICLAIC, arts. 4, 10, 33 I.L.M. at 734, 735 (applying international
commercial law.) See QUINN'S DIGEST supra note 18, at 1-11 (discussing incorporation
of law merchant in U.C.C. § 1-103). Professor Quinn explains:
Section 1-103, one of the most important sections of the Code, provides that
the "principles of law and equity" have continued applicability except insofar
as they are expressly "displaced" by the particular provisions of the Code.
These supplemental bodies of law include the law relative to capacity to con-
tract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, bankruptcy, and
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tion of results in international trade transactions.264 By establish-
ing standard choice-of-law principles, the ICLAIC attempts to re-
move the differences that arise between contracting parties who
reside in different countries.265 Third, the ICLAIC supports the
notion of equal bargaining power between contracting parties by
advancing both the freedom of contract principle between con-
tracting parties. 266 By simultaneously setting out choice-of-law
standards267 the ICLAIC increases the likelihood that the law of
the weaker party's home state may apply to the transaction.268
so on. The Code by no means covers all aspect of commercial transactions
but, rather, assumes the continuing existence of a larger body of pre-Code and
non-Code law on which it rests for support. It should also be noted that fed-
eral commercial and regulatory law override the Code."
Id. at 1-12. See also Symposium, The Codification of International Commercial Law: Toward
a New Law Merchant, 15 BROO.J. INT'L L. 1 (1989) (discussing supplemental support of
general principles in application of C.I.S.G.). See generally supra notes 129-34 and ac-
companying text (defining and discussing law merchant).
264. ICLAIC, supra note 2, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 733; id. art. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 734
(examining need to promote uniformity). See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (providing
uniformity of law as objective of U.C.C.); C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 7(1), 19 I.L.M. at
673 (discussing uniformity in application).
265. See, e.g., ICLAIC, supra note 2, arts. 8, 12, 13, 33 I.L.M. 735, 735-36 (validating
contracts across multi-state boundaries); id. art. 11, 33 I.L.M. 736 (enforcing mandatory
rules of another State with which contract has close ties).
266. Id. art. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 734.
267. Id. arts. 7, 9, 33 I.L.M. at 734, 735.
268. See Hartnell, supra note 44, at 5 (discussing the need for uniform law for
international sales to replace obsolete domestic rules). The unification of the law of
sale is especially "important for economically weaker traders who can not manage the
risks and expenses of doing business under a foreign law as well as larger companies
who had access to legal advice." Id. The risks and problems involved in international
transactions which are not commonly found in domestic transactions exists because of
the diversity of legal rules that may be applicable to such transactions. Cf supra note 17
and accompanying text (providing the seller's place of business as functional guide to
the court's determination of applicable law).
The additional risks and problems involved in an international transactions
stem from a number of factors: (1) a seller may hesitate to ship goods to a
distant buyer without assurance of payment; a buyer may hesitate to pay a
distant seller before he has inspected the goods or at least knows that the
goods have been shipped; (2) at least one of the parties will.have to deal in a
foreign currency; (3) often the parties will not share a common native lan-
guage, increasing the risk of misunderstanding over the basic terms of the
transaction; (4) the transaction will typically be subject to more government
regulation than a domestic transaction and in addition will be subject to the
regulation of more than one government; (5) more than one legal system and
one set of business customs will be involved, which may also give rise to misun-
derstandings and which raises the difficult questions of which law and which
customs are to be applied in the even of a dispute; and (6) if a dispute arises
or a contract is breached, the determination and enforcement of contract ob-
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The primary goal of the ICLAIC, to develop a uniform law for
international sales contracts, promotes fairness between parties
in the international commercial context and guides the drafting
of standard contracts.2
69
A. Codification of Existing Private International Law
In addition to establishing uniform choice-of-law rules, 70
the ICLAIC follows established principles of commercial law ap-
plicable to international contracts.2 7 1 The ICLAIC requires that
contracts be interpreted and enforced in light of generally ac-
cepted principles of international commercial law and prac-
272tice. Accordingly, the ICLAIC applies a body of contemporary
lex mercatoria to international contracts.273 Further, this forms
the basis upon which the system of laws is adopted and codified
by all commercial nations.2 74
1. Article 10
Article 10 states that in order to discharge the requirements
of justice and equity in any case before a court, the judge must
apply principles of international commercial law2 75 as well as
commercial usage2 7 6 and practices. 77 The approach used in the
ligations will be more difficult since foreign courts and foreign legal rules may
be involved.
JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 13, at 36. Some of these problems, or so-called transaction
costs, of doing business on an international level, could be "minimized or eliminated if
customs and practices could be standardized and made uniform throughout the world."
Id.
269. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 13, at 36.
270. See ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 735 (providing uniform choice-
of-law rules).
271. Id. arts. 4, 10, 33 I.L.M. at 734, 735.
272. Id. art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
273. F.K Juenger, General Course on Private International Law, in 4 ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES COURS COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 131, 169 (1985) [hereinafterJuenger] (discussing lex mercatoria
as "supranational" body of law to resolve multi-state transactions).
274. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text (discussing lex mercatoria as ba-
sis for codification and development of U.C.C.).
275. See ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735 (applying "the guidelines,
customs, and principles of international commercial law").
276. Id. (applying commercial usage). Cf U.C.C. § 1-205 (recognizing "trade us-
age" as applicable to parties to contract).
277. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
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ICLAIC parallels the "closest connection" test 278 in the Rome
Convention,279 as well as the "proper law"28° of the contract test
in English law.28 The ICLAIC, in the absence of a choice-of-law
2812provision by the parties, requires a forum court to take into
278. See Hiy, supra note 261, at 382 (discussing closest connection test under arti-
cle 7(1) of Rome Convention).
279. Rome Convention, supra note 5, art. 4, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2, OJ. L 266/1
(1980). The Rome Convention is a choice-of-law convention which applies to contrac-
tual obligations in any situation involving different countries. Id. art. 1. The Rome
Convention establishes uniform rules concerning the law applicable to contractual obli-
gations within the "European Economic Community" Id. pmbl., 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
2, OJ. L 266/1 (1980). Similarly, the ICLAIC establishes uniform rules concerning the
law applicable to contractual obligations within the O.A.S. community. ICLAIC, supra
note 2, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 735. Any reference herewithin to the Rome Convention's
choice-of-law provisions or terms are used for interpretive purposes only in order to
provide interpretive guidance to terms and provisions within the ICLAIC which are not
defined or explained. Compare Rome Convention, supra note 5, arts. 3-4, 7-8, 1992 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 2, O.J. L 266/1 (1980) (choice-of-law provisions) with ICLAIC, supra note
2, arts. 7-9, 11-12, 33 I.L.M. at 734-35 (parallel choice-of-law provisions).
The ICLAIC differs from the Rome Convention, insofar as the Rome Convention
presumes that the contract has the closest connection to the state of the habitual resi-
dence of the party (or principal place of business of the company). Rome Convention,
supra note 5, art. 4, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2, OJ. L 266/1 (1980). The ICLAIC does
not use a mechanical test, such as the principal place of business test of the Rome
Convention, to determine the applicable law. ICLAIC, arts. 9, 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
Rome Convention, supra note 5, art. 4(2) provides several factors to guide the
judge in determining the closest connection test.
[I]t shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with the
country where the part), who is to effect the performance which is characteris-
tic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the contract, his habitual
residence, or, in the case of a body corporate or unincorporate, its central
administration. However, if the contract is entered into in the course of that
party's trade or profession, that country shall be the country in which the prin-
cipal place of business is situated or, where under the terms of the contract the
performance is to be effected through a place of business other than the prin-
cipal place of business, the country in which that other place of business is
situated.
Id. See Hay, supra note 261, at 360 (discussing closest connection factor of a "functional
conflicts rule" in which abstract policy factors rather than geographical data are used to
predetermine applicable law). " '[F] unctional allocation ... only "works" if the law to
be applied reflects the same or a similar policy as our own' " and that the starting point
tends to be the policy of the forum.'" Id. at 360 n.338. See supra note 237 and accom-
panying text (discussing functional factors in ICLAIC to determine closest tie test).
280. Hay, supra note 261, at 359. "Under English law, there was doubt whether the
"proper law" determination sought to identify the closest connection to a State ("Juris-
diction") or to a legal system." Id. at 360 n.338.
281. Id.
282. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 734. The ICLAIC provides the par-
ties to the contract and the court of the forum several options in determining applica-
ble law. Id. arts. 7-11, 33 I.L.M. at 734-35. In regard to the discretion of the contracting
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account all objective and subjective elements of the contract to
decide the forum to which the contract has the closest connec-
tion.2"' Although the ICLAIC does not define the objective and
subjective elements to be weighed,2" 4 the ICLAIC's Article 10
provides for the codification of existing law by providing the
judges with authority to apply generally accepted principles of
international commercial law and practice to contracts, regard-
less of the law of the contract chosen by the parties. 8 5
2. The Emerging Law Merchant
Recently, some legal writers have begun to explore the pos-
sibility of an emerging lex mercatoria, or law merchant,28 6 as a
source of uniform choice-of-law rules for international con-
tracts.28 7 Historically, commentators have suggested that legisla-
parties, Article 7 allows applicable law to be chosen by the parties. Id. at 734. Article 8
allows modifications of that choice by agreement of the parties at any time. Id. at 735.
Regarding discretionary provisions of the court, Article 9 provides relief in the absence
of choice by the parties. Id. It states the contract shall be governed by the law of the
State which it has the closest ties. Id. The Court will take into account objective and
subjective elements of the contract to make their determination. Id. The Court may
sever parts of the contract if that part which is separable has a closer tie with another
State. Id. The parties and the courts may also look to guidelines, customs, and princi-
ples of international commercial law, commercial usage and practices generally ac-
cepted, in order to discharge the requirements of justice and equity in the particular
case. Id. art 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735. Notwithstanding these provisions, the forum decides
whether mandatory requirements of another State with which the contract has close ties
are applicable. Id. art. 11, 33 LL.M. at 735.
283. Id. art. 9, 33 IL.M. at 735.
284. See id. (pointing out that elements to be weighed shall apply as justice and
equity dictate).
285. Id. art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735 (applying generally accepted principles of interna-
tional commercial law "[iln addition to [choice-of-law] provisions").
286. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of "law
merchant"). See also Introduction to the Symposium, supra note 23, at 419 (describing
newly introduced C.I.S.G. as the emerging lex mercatoria of international contract law).
287. Juenger, supra note 273, at 167-169.
[H]istory allows us... to identify the approaches that have been tried...
and to assess their strengths and weaknesses. There are only three basic meth-
ods:
(1) The creation of multistate rules of decision (the substantive law ap-
proach);
(2) A choice from among the potentially applicable local rules of decision
premised on ascertaining their personal and territorial reach (the unilateral
approach);
(3) The interposition of choice-of-law rules (the multilateral approach).
All of these approaches have coexisted since the Middle Ages. But while
the "pluralism of methods" is not a new phenomenon, it has assumed consid-
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tion and regulations pertaining to sales contracts should recog-
nize the advantages of a competitive marketplace. 88 Such treat-
ment would require that the customary practices of participants,
rather than complicated rules and unequal regulatory treat-
ment, would set the rules for contract performance. 28 9 Because
the danger of transacting a non-enforceable contract is greater
without unification of either choice-of-law rules or substantive
legal rules,2 90 the ICLAIC, in mandating the application of prin-
ciples and practices developed in the international trade mar-
ket,291 provides a harmonizing contract rule that, according to
some commentators, would reduce costs associated with the
nonenforceability of an international contract.292
erable importance in our days. In recent times, both in the United States and
in Europe, there are trends away from rigid multilateral choice-of-law rules
and towards a revival of unilateralism. At the same time, some legal writers
have begun to explore the possibility of once again resolving multistate
problems in a supranational fashion, and there is talk about an emerging new
lex mercatoria.
Id.
288. Lee E. Gunderson, Statement before the Senate Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs Committee, May 6, 1981, reprinted in George Roche, Government Involvement
Is Harmful to the Economy, in ECONOMICS IN AMERICA OPPOSING VIEwPOINrs 25, 25 (Gree-
nhaven Press 1986).
289. Id.
290. Winship 1, supra note 14, at 532-33. The analysis of enforceability of a con-
tract with a foreign trading parmer is difficult and proposes a greater risk of error
without unification of either choice-of-law rules or the substantive legal rules. Id.
291. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735 (applying "commercial usage
and practices generally accepted").
292. SeeJuenger, supra note 273, 167-69 (discussing new lex mercatoria approach to
choice-of-law rules). See Hartnell, supra note 44 (discussing the disparate treatment of
contracting parties and need for equal treatment);Jackson & Davey, supra note 13 (dis-
cussing risks associated with international contract). See Cheryl W. Gray & William W.
Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience From Central and
Eastern Europe, 33 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 13 (1995) (discussing transaction costs of
doing business as-yet-unidentified liability). Legal regimes can impede foreign invest-
ment by creating different rules for foreign investors and different rules for domestic
investors. Id. at 17. Such behavior by the legal regimes results in an "enclave of special
legislation." Id.
The enclave typically serves at least three purposes. First, it provides an
important information - or "signaling" -function to potential investors by
showing that the government is serious in its efforts to create a market based
economy. Second, it provides a limited sphere in which legal development
can proceed more rapidly, and thus bypass many of the hurdles to legal and
institutional development in the economy at large. Third, in recognition of
the costs the present institutional structure may impose on foreign investors,
an enclave allows for incentives targeted at foreign investors to offset such
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B. Harmonization of Results in Multi-State Transactions
International trade transactions may be facilitated either by
the creation of uniform contract law293 or by the creation of uni-
form choice-of-law rules.294 The ICLAIC facilitates international
trade transactions by establishing uniform choice-of-law rules for
multi-state contracts.295 In addition, the ICLAIC allows the fo-
rum court to apply mandatory rules of public policy 96 notwith-
standing the choice-of-law rules established by the Conven-
tion.297
1. Validating Contracts Across Multi-State Boundaries
To determine the applicable law to an international transac-
tion the ICLAIC poses several questions concerning the validity
and existence of the international contract.2 98 First, whether or
not the parties have made a valid choice.299 Second, whether or
not the parties have a valid consent to the choice of law. 0°
Third, whether or not the parties choice-of-law provision is valid
in form.30 ' If the ICLAIC's approach of deciding separately the
valid choice of law, the valid consent of the parties and the valid
form proves effective, parties would be able to pre-determine
what law will govern their contract thus promoting harmoniza-
costs.... [W]hile these purposes may be valid, the enclave approach entails
major costs for the host country .... that must be weighed against its benefits.
Id.
293. Diamond, supra note 3, at 242 (discussing necessity and benefit of harmoniz-
ing substantive rules). See e.g., International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT): Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994); 34 I.L.M.
1067 (1995). (providing express and implied substantive law for international commer-
cial contracts). See also William A. Andres, Speech delivered to the American Associa-
tion of Exporters and Importers (May 23, 1985), reprinted in ECONOMICS IN AMERICA
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 15 (1986) (referring to problems resulting from "myriad local
laws").
294. Juenger, supra note 273, at 241 (discussing effect of choice-of-law rules).
295. ICLAIC, supra note 2, arts. 7-11, 33 I.L.M. at 734-35 (setting forth rules for
determinations of law applicable to multi-state contracts).
296. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (explaining term "mandatory
rules").
297. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
298. Id. arts. 12, 13, 33 I.L.M. at 735-36.
299. Id. art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
300. Id. art. 12, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
301. Id. art. 13, 33 I.L.M. at 736.
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tion in their international transactions.s 2
First, where parties select the applicable law of their con-
tract and it proves effective under the ICLAIC,30 3 the same law
may be applied to resolve the second question concerning the
validity of a party's consent to that selection. 0 4 In such cases,
however, the ICLAIC determines as a separate question whether
or not the choice of law governing the contract should apply to
determining the validity of the party's consent to the choice."0 5
The ICLAIC requires the court to take into account the habitual
residence or principal place of business of the party in making
its determination.0 6
Separate from the questions on the selection of the applica-
ble law and valid consent of the parties, the third question is
whether the contract is valid as to form.307 The ICLAIC provides
that if the contract complies with the law governing the sub-
stance of the contract,0 8 which would be the body of state law
selected by the parties in the contract itself, 09 the contract
would be valid as to form. 1 0 In the absence of choice, however,
the contract will be valid as to form if it meets the requirements
of the law of one of the states in which it was concluded.' Al-
ternatively, it will be valid as to form if it complies with the law of
302. See id. pmbl., arts. 12-13, 33 I.L.M. at 733, 735-36, (harmonization goal and
validation provisions).
303. See id. art. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 734 (providing rules that govern selection of applica-
ble law by parties). See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing guidelines
provided by ICLAIC for courts to determine applicable law).
304. Id. art. 12, 33 I.L.M. at 735. In such cases, the court has the authority to
determine applicable law governing the validity of consent, "taking into account the
habitual residence or principal place of business" of the party. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Cf supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing formal requirements
for contracts under U.C.C.). Formal validity concerns the compliance of the contract
with contract law requirements regarding the form in which the contract of the parties
must be expressed. See Joseph Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions
and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 39, 43-68 (1974) (discussing functions of
formal requirements in contract law). See also, ROBERTO UNGER, LAw IN MODERN SOCI-
EY, 203-16 (1976) (discussing function of formalities); Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil
Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1009,
1016-17 (1959) (discussing function of formalities in comparative law).
308. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 734.
309. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (noting choice of substantive law
left to parties).
310. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 13, 33 I.L.M. at 736.
311. Id.
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the situs of contract performance."1 2 The ICLAIC favors holding
the contract valid if possible.3 1 3  The ICLAIC attempt to re-
duce 3 4 situations in which a contract may be rescinded due to
formal invalidity.313
2. Mandatory Rules Concerning Choice of Law
Despite the choice-of-law freedom given to contracting par-
ties under other articles of the ICLAIC,316 the forum is permit-
ted to apply "mandatory requirements" 317 to the contract.318
Thus, the ICLAIC's presumption in favor of the law of the partic-
ular state chosen by the contract may be displaced by the fo-
rum's determination that the foreign law is offensive to the fo-
rum's public policy and is not to be applied. 1 9 While the
ICLAJC does not define this concept of mandatory require-
ments, 320 the concept traditionally includes rules of public or-
der.3 2' These rules serve to promote government interests.3 2
312. Id.
313. Id. Article 13 distinguishes between a contract between parties in the same
state and parties in different states at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Id. It
provides:
A contract between parties in the same state shall be valid as to form if it meets
the requirements laid down in the law governing said contract pursuant to this
Convention or with those of the law of the State in which the contract is valid
or with the law of the place where the contract is performed. If the persons
concerned are in different States at the time of its conclusion, the contract
shall be valid as to form if it meets the requirements of the law governing it as
to substance, or those of the law of one of the States in which it is concluded
or with the law of the place where the contract is performed.
Id.
314. See ICLAIC, supra note 2, arts. 8, 12, 33 I.L.M. at 735 (providing for validity of
contract under ICLAIC choice-of-law provisions).
315. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (defining term "validity" which may
involve either material validity or formal validity).
316. Id. arts. 7, 8, 33 I.L.M. at 734-35 (stating law of contract to be chosen by
parties). See supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing ICLAIC's freedom-of-
choice clause).
317. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 735. See supra note 239 and accom-
panying text (discussing mandatory requirements).
318. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 735. The ICLAIC allows the forum
to decide mandatory provisions to be applied to contract. Id.
319. Hay, supra note 261, at 377.
320. See ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 735 (discussing mandatory rules
with which the contract has close ties is decided by forum).
321. Cf Rome Convention, supra note 5, art. 7 (providing for application of
mandatory rules of forum in provisions separate from public order exception to choice-
of-law rules in Rome Convention Article 6). Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention,
which has now been adopted by all member states. Hay, supra note 261, at 382, n.442.
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They override the otherwise applicable law, including the con-
tract law chosen by the parties, in order to effectuate the forum's
policy in cases before it.123 Such public policies include those
regulatory in nature 324 and those derived from public law.12 5
C. Equal Bargaining Power
Economic theorists believe that in the absence of legal rules
to the contrary, parties try to exploit strategic opportunities and
create uncertainty with regard to the conditions under which
performance will occur.3 2 6 Legal commentators have noted that
conventions have sought to counter this type of economic ex-
ploitation by either filling gaps327 and setting out international
minimum standards,328 or by mandating that rules provided
under the convention shall apply to nonsignatories to the con-
vention.329 Similarly, the ICLAIC intends to promote economic
interdependence by facilitating international contracts 3 0 and
The Convention permits the court to give effect to the mandatory rules of a third coun-
try which was a close connection to the case at hand, other than the forum state chosen
by the parties or the forum's stipulated choice-of-law rules. Id. at 382. It remains to be
seen how Article 7(1) will work in practice however, the attorney should be aware of the
several tangents that the courts may apply in the view of public interest or private party
interests. Id. at 383.
322. Hay, supra note 261, at 380.
323. Id. at 381.
324. Id. at n.439.
325. Id. at 381.
326. Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT
LAW 4 (Little, Brown and Company 1979) [hereinafter ECONOMIC THEORY].
327. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing usage of trade to resolve
any ambiguity in agreement).
328. Ole Lando, The Conflict of Laws of Contracts General Principes, 6 ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES COURS COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 225, 362 (1984). One of the international minimum standards
which the ICLAIC establishes is that the contracting parties select the law to apply to
the contract, which is to be evidenced in the contract. ICLAIC, supra, note 2, art. 7, 33
I.L.M. at 735. The law chosen must have close tie to contract. Id. art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at
735. Another example of an international minimum standard that is instituted by the
ICLAIC is that in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, the ICLAIC will deter-
mine the applicable law to the contract, by establishing which contracting party's law
has the closest ties to the contract. Id.
329. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 2432, 2499 (1994) (discussing application of international intellectual
property rules to nonsignatory parties to contracts involving patents and copyrights).
330. ICLAIC, supra note 2, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 733. "[T]he economic interdepen-
dence of States has fostered regional integration and . . . in order to stimulate the
process it is necessary to facilitate international contracts ... ." Id.
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attempts to supply guidance to the parties when terms are not
set out expressly in the contract,331 and requires that the law that
it designates as applying to a contract must be used even if it is
the law of a state that is not a party to the convention. 3 2
Unlike the Rome Convention, which presupposes that the
law of the seller's home state will generally apply33 3 the ICLAIC
allows the parties to bargain freely over the law that will apply to
their contract.334 Where the parties do not choose the law of the
contract, the ICLAIC itself permits the respective laws of the
buyer's and seller's home states to govern separable parts of the
contract, if each part has a closer tie to one state or the other.335
III. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT ADOPT ICLAIC
BECAUSE THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE ICLAIC
OUTWEIGH ITS BENEFITS
In theory, the ICLAIC offers advantages for O.A.S. Member
States. 336 The intended benefits of the ICLAIC arise from its
promotion of uniformity in international contract law.337 In
practice, however, these provisions would prove unpredictable
and inconsistent when compared with current domestic and in-
ternational contract law utilized in the United States.338 The
United States, therefore, should not adopt the ICLAIC.
A. The Intended Benefits Associated with U.S. Adoption of
the ICLAIC
The purposes of the ICLAIC are to improve and unify inter-
national contract law.3 3 9 First, the ICLAIC appears to promote
uniformity in international contract law by establishing uniform
standards for determining the applicable law governing interna-
tional contracts.3 40 Second, it encourages equal bargaining be-
331. Id. art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
332. Id. art. 2, 33 1.L.M. at 733.
333. Rome Convention, supra note 5, art. 4(2), 1992 Gr. Brt. T.S. No. 2, O.J. L
266/1 (1980).
334. ICLAIC, supra note 2, arts. 7-8, 33 I.L.M. at 734-35.
335. Id. art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
336. See supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text (outlining benefits of ICLAIC).
337. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art 4., 33 I.L.M. at 734.
338. Cf Paradigm, supra note 5, at 185 (criticizing uncertainty involved in provi-
sions of Rome Convention, which are similar to those of ICLAIC).
339. ICLAIC, supra note 2, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 734.
340. Id. art. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 734.
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tween contracting parties in different states by granting equal
weight to a buyer's place of business.3 41 Third, the ICLAIC pro-
vides the forum court with broad authority to promote govern-
ment interests despite the existence of an explicit choice-of-law
provision in the contract.3 42
1. Uniformity in International Contract Law
The ICLAIC attempts to promote uniformity in interna-
tional contract law,3 43 as evidenced by provisions seeking to es-
tablish a concrete standard for determining applicable law."4
Uniformity is a benefit because it promotes a consistent under-
standing among market participants, increasing cooperation
among the parties.3 4 Furthermore, uniformity reduces transac-
tion costs accompanying international contracts. 3 46
a. Providing a Cooperative Forum
The process of bringing together community members to
discuss comparative law at a legislative level facilitates commu-
nity interaction, and promotes continued cooperation and un-
derstanding. 47 This interaction allows groups currently ex-
cluded from the legislative process to exert greater influence34
on the regulatory process by expressing their policy prefer-
341. Id. art. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 735 (determining applicable law). Cf Paradigm, supra
note 5, at 182 (noting benefits of equal bargaining by protecting "traditionally weaker
parties" under Rome Convention provisions corresponding to ICLAIC).
342. ICLAIC, supra note 2, 33 I.L.M. at 734.
343. Id. pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 733 (facilitating international contracts "by removing
differences in the legal framework").
344. Id. pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 734.
345. Perillo, supra note 30, at 285. Perillo argues that, if markets are to function
properly and efficiently, they must be policed and regulated, and the rules of decision
must be uniformly applied. Id.
346. EcoNoMIc THEORY, supra note 326, at 4. See supra note 268 and accompany-
ing text (discussing transaction costs associated with international contracts).
347. Paradigm, supra note 5, at 182. "If a true 'community' is the ultimate goal of
the [drafters], an act which facilitates community interaction is highly desirable." Id.
348. C. Frederick Beckner, The FDA's War on Drugs, 82 GEO. L.J. 529, 557 (1993).
Professor Macey argues that judicial review and the Framers' constitutional
scheme of separation of powers are consistent when two conditions are satis-
fied: Judicial review must (1) result in making legislation more public-regard-
ing by serving as a check on legislative excess, and it must (2) not intrude on
the constitutional authority of the legislature to make law.
Id. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31, (1989) (discussing interest group theory). "Increasing transactions
costs can encourage interest group activity." Id. at 88.
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ences. 4 To the extent that the ICLAIC rules vary from domes-
tic legislation, adoption of the ICLAIC may provide an opportu-
nity for legislators to review350 domestic legislation, and revise it
to achieve results similar to ICLAIC's goals.35 1
b. Reducing Transaction Costs
The transaction costs of doing business overseas can be sig-
nificantly higher than those of domestic transactions.352 The
risk of non-enforceability of a contract with a foreign trading
partner is greater3 5 3 absent unification of either choice-of-law
rules or substantive legal rules governing contractual transac-
tions." Potential liabilities arising from unenforceable contract
impose costs on each party.3 55 Because of the greater chance of
unenforceability of international contracts, where conflicting
laws may apply, increased transaction costs accompany interna-
tional transactions.35 6 Actors in the market must have reason,
therefore, to trust the integrity of the market and the transac-
tions conducted in the global marketplace. 57
2. Equal Bargaining Positions
The ICLAIC's attempt to equalize parties' bargaining posi-
tions358 benefits contracting parties by encouraging freedom to
contract, 359 and promoting the development of the commercial
349. Beckner, supra note 348, at 557. The legislative and judicial process approach
seeks to correct the source of the political market failure. Id.
350. See Notice from the State Department, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262-02 (1987). "Traders and
their counsel are advised to study the C.I.S.G. carefully .... " Id.
351. See supra notes 345-46 and accompanying text (discussing need to harmonize
domestic law to reflect international law). Winship III, supra note 29, 50-92 (discussing
revision of U.C.C. in light of C.I.S.G.). See generally Perillo, supra note 30 (discussing
unlikely result of uniformity unless merchants and their attorneys have information
made available to them regarding implementation).
352. See Gray &Jarosz, supra note 292, at 13 (discussing transaction costs).
353. ECONOMic THEORY, supra note 326, at 26 (discussing risk).
354. Winship 3, supra note 29, at 45-48. Costs of non-uniformity are barriers to the
free flow of trade in goods. Id.
355. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 13, at 36.
356. Id.
357. See Perillo, supra note 30, at 316 (discussing interdependence of market-
place).
358. See supra notes 326-35 and accompanying text (discussing equal bargaining
power under ICLAIC).
359. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 7, 33 LL.M. at 734.
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law of smaller countries. 360 Freedom of the parties to determine
the choice of law is recognized in many countries,3 61 and implies
that the express or presumed intentions of the parties will deter-
mine the law of the contract.3 62 Current U.S. policy towards do-
mestic and international contracts supports this goal of freedom
of contract, 363 in order to simplify commercial transactions and
to encourage the continued expansion of commercial prac-
tices.364 By encouraging equal bargaining power, the ICLAIC
gives smaller countries a greater stake in the legislative process
of international contract law.365 Specifically, parties may not
chose an economically stronger state's law if a smaller state takes
the initiative to enact contract rules that are more useful to the
parties.3 66 Consequently, the United States' smaller trading part-
ners may be encouraged to develop their commercial laws to
meet their citizens' needs for useful contract rules. 367 In addi-
tion, under the ICLAIC, the weaker transacting party's state law
has an equal opportunity, in principle, to determine the legal
rights and obligations of the contract.3 68
3. Judicial Discretion
The ICLAIC preserves governments' policy interests by pro-
viding judicial discretion to promote public policy require-
ments. 369  First, the ICLAIC compels the application of
360. Id. art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735. See supra notes 306-13 and accompanying text
(discussing effect of Article 10).
361. See Lando, supra note 328, at 255-66 (discussing theory of free choice recog-
nized in many countries, its historical development, and its application in legal systems
of today).
362. Id. at 255.
363. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing current U.S. policy
under U.C.C. and C.I.S.G.).
364. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (a), (c) (providing that purpose of U.C.C. is to sim-
plify transactions and permit continued expansion).
365. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
366. Cf Paradigm, supra note 5, at 179 (discussing similar effect on "weaker par-
ties" under Rome Convention).
367. ICLAIC, supra note 2, arts. 3-4, 33 I.L.M. at 734 (applying ICLAIC in develop-
ment of international trade; promoting uniformity in application of ICLAIC).
368. See id. art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 735 (selection of applicable law in absence of choice
by parties to contract).
369. See id. art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 735 (discussing mandatory rules with which con-
tract has close ties to be decided by forum). See also supra note 321 and accompanying
text (discussing mandatory rules as defined under Rome Convention). Cf Rome Con-
vention, supra note 5, art. 7, 1992 Gr. Brit., T.S. No. 2, O.J. L 266/1 (198) (providing
rules for application of mandatory rules of forum, separate from article 6 public order
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mandatory rules of the forum.37 ° Such mandatory rules serve
primarily to override the otherwise applicable law, in order to
effectuate the forum's policy in cases connected to it.3 71 Second,
the ICLAIC provides for the application of generally applicable
commercial standards, which are enforced in the interest of jus-
tice and equity.3 7
2
B. The Disadvantages Associated with U.S. Adoption of the ICLAIC
Despite the intended benefits of the ICLAIC, its adoption
may present serious disadvantages for the United States.3 7' The
C.I.S.G. and the U.C.C. are two authoritative texts that currently
govern U.S. contract law.3 74 An additional text, such as the
ICLAIC, would create conflict, resulting in unpredictability for
U.S. parties to international contracts. 375 Such tension between
these three texts will lead to inconsistency in U.S. substantive
contract law.376
1. Unpredictability and Uncertainty
If the United States were to adopt the ICLAIC, it would face
three sets of concerns regarding the uniformity of international
contract rules. First, U.S. law would have to resolve when domes-
tic contract rules, like the U.C.C., could be applied by agree-
ment of the parties to a contract, to the exclusion of one or
exception to choice-of-law rules). Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention, which has now
been adopted by all member states, permits the forum court to give effect to the
mandatory rules of a third country that has a close connection to the case at hand,
regardless of the forum state chosen by the parties or the forum's stipulated choice-of-
law rules. Hay, supra note 261, at 382 n.442. While it remains to be seen how Article
7(1) will work in practice, counsel should be aware of the several tangents that the
courts may apply in the view of public interest or private party interests. Id. at 383.
370. Hay, supra note 261, at 380.
371. Id. at 381.
372. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735. See supra notes 275-85 and
accompanying text (discussing effect of Article 10).
373. Cf Paradigm, supra note 5, at 183-93 (discussing disadvantages of adopting
Rome Convention, substantially similar to ICLAIC).
374. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting that U.C.C. and C.I.S.G.
coexist as U.S. contract law).
375. See, e.g., Paradigm, supra note 5, at 184-85 (analyzing problems of uncertainty
in implementation of Rome Convention).
376. See, e.g., supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistency be-
tween ICLAIC and C.I.S.G. contract modification provisions).
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more provisions of the ICLAIC.177 Second, where a contract
lacks express agreement as to whether the C.I.S.G. or the
ICLAIC applies, no U.S. law would exist to resolve such a con-
flict178 Finally, in a contract involving a party in the United
States, an ICLAIC jurisdiction and a non-U.S. party of a non-
ICLAIC jurisdiction, a conflict would arise as to whether the
ICLAIC or the applicable law of the non-ICLAIC jurisdiction
would control179 when the contract is silent on operative law.
Though the ICLAIC embraces existing general principles of
law," ° the language of the ICLAIC is intentionally ambiguous, 8 1
encourages judicial discretion in resolving conflicts, 82 and pro-
vides no neutral basis for judicial resolution of conflicts.3 83 The
ICLAIC concedes to the forum court great discretion in deter-
mining alternative law,384 except where parties provide an ex-
377. Cf Perillo, supra note 30, at 283 (discussing function of new legislation and
other international agreements).
378. Cf id. at 284 (discussing rules of new legislation at variance with rules laid
down by earlier legislation). See Hartnell, supra note 44, at 5 (discussing range of inter-
pretations available to adjudicators and proposing a "middle of the road" approach).
See Perillo, supra note 30, at 284 (discussing process of mutual education and expansion
of understanding required to break out of common law and civil law conceptual
frameworks).
379. Cf Perillo, supra note 30, at 283 (discussing rules of conflict of law and practi-
cal uses for judge, arbitrator or practicing lawyer to have neutral resource of law to
apply to State whose law is obscure, undeveloped, or merely difficult to ascertain).
380. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
381. See UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 143 (indicating that language of C.I.S.G.
intentionally ambiguous, because of its basis in compromise between advocates of dif-
ferent legal systems).
382. See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity of terms
"closest ties" and "mandatory requirement"). See also ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 6, 33
I.L.M. at 734 (providing that "The provisions of this Convention shall not be applicable
to contracts which have autonomous regulations in international conventional law in
force among the States Parties to this Convention"). The "autonomous regulations"
provision must refer to something other than the application of other international
conventions, since otherwise Article 20 of the ICLAIC would be superfluous. See Id. art.
20, 33 I.L.M. at 737 (providing for continued application of other conventions, notwith-
standing the ICLAIC). Cf. Perillo, supra note 30, at 285 (discussing problem of ambigu-
ity). While international conventions are ambiguous because of their basis in compro-
mise between advocates of different legal systems, contract parties are always free to
avoid such ambiguity by employing clear language. Id.
383. See Perillo, supra note 30, at 283 (discussing practical effects of providing neu-
tral resources of law).
384. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing forum's determination
of applicable law). See also supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing C.I.S.G.
conflict-of-laws imbroglio).
The ICLAIC allows forum court discretion to determine applicable law in the ab-
1995] INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS
press choice-of-law provision.38 5 Instead of promoting certainty
for parties to international contracts, the ICLAIC's deference to
judicial discretion would lead to unpredictable results in adjudi-
cating disputes between contracting parties.
As a result of such unpredictability, the ICLAIC would pro-
mote forum shopping by encouraging parties to bring suit in
states whose public policy interests would induce judges to apply
laws favorable to them. 8 7 Consequently, the ICLAIC frustrates
the freedom of contract, and impedes contracting parties' ability
to determine the risks and obligations that they will incur.
2. Frustration of Existing U.S. Substantive Law
If the United States were to adopt the ICLAIC, contract law
would be defined by the C.I.S.G., the U.C.C., and the ICLAIC. 3ss
By its own terms, the C.I.S.G. provides rules of international con-
tract formation.38 9 Whereas the C.I.S.G. provides substantive
rules for international contract formation, and the U.C.C. offers
substantive rules for domestic contracts, the ICLAIC provides a
set of choice-of-law principles that determine whose substantive
law will apply.390 As a choice-of-law document, however, the
ICLAIC would nullify application of both the C.I.S.G. and the
U.C.C. in certain situations. 91
sence of choice of law. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 735. See supra note
236 and accompanying text (discussing forum choice-of-law in absence of parties'
choice).
385. ICLAIC, supra note 2, arts. 7-11, 33 I.L.M. 734-35.
386. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing ULIS and ULF and
their failure as result of rejecting private international law rules and applying universal-
ist approach). Cf Paradigm, supra note 5, at 200-01 (discussing Rome Convention and
need for uniform tribunal).
387. Lando, supra note 328, at 401.
388. Cf Perillo, supra note 30, at 282-317 (discussing application of UNIDROIT
Principles and interplay of U.C.C. and C.I.S.G.).
389. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, arts. 14-24, 19 I.L.M. at 674-77. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text (noting that C.I.S.G. applies only to international contracts for sale
of goods).
390. See supra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing term "applicable law").
See ICLAIC, art. 14, 33 I.L.M. at 736 (discussing law applicable under ICLAIC to govern
substantive contract issues); see also id. art. 20, 33 I.L.M. at 737 (providing that ICLAIC
does not affect application of other pertinent international conventions to which
ICLAIC member is party, if declaration is made).
391. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory require-
ments of forum in spite of choice of law by parties). But see supra note 239 and accom-
panying text (discussing possible "mandatory requirements" of U.S. law under ICLAIC
Article 11). ICLAIC provides that the selection of a forum by the parties does not nec-
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C. Practical Application of the ICLAIC: Four Scenarios
Assuming for the sake of discussion that the United States
had become a party to the ICLAIC, the following scenarios illus-
trate the possible interplay between the U.C.C., the C.I.S.G., and
the ICLAIC.39 The three U.C.C. provisions chosen to elucidate
the effects of this interplay include: (1) the unconscionability
provision;3 9 (2) the provision governing exclusion or modifica-
tion of warranties;394 and (3) the provision governing third-party
beneficiaries of warranties, 395 all of which are found in Part
essarily entail selection of applicable law governing the contract. ICLAIC, supra note 2,
art. 7., 33 I.L.M. at 734. See supra note 369 and accompanying text (discussing need for
counsel to be aware that lex fora does not assume jurisdiction of applicable law).
392. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 20, 33 I.L.M. 737. As of February 1992, the follow-
ing member states of the OA.S. are signatories of the C.I.S.G.: Argentina, Chile, Ecua-
dor, Mexico, United States, and Venezuela. Randall & Norris, supra note 21, at 612
n.48.
393. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing U.C.C. unconscionabil-
ity provision). U.C.C. § 2-302 states:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id. § 2-302(1).
394. Id. § 2-316. This provision states:
(1) ... [N]egation or limitation [of express warranties] is inoperative to
the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) ... [T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability
(created under § 2-314] or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in the case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to ex-
clude or modify any implied warranty of fitness [created under § 2-315] the
exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
Id.
395. Id. § 2-318. This provision, which focusses on products liability exists in three
alternative formulations in the Official Draft of the U.C.C. See id. (setting forth three
alternative provisions).
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implies extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if
it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implies extends to any natural person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
1995] INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 729




Parties agree to operative law Y Y N Y
ICLAIC member XX XX XX XX
C.I.S.G. member X XX X XX
U.C.C. member X X X XX
U.C.C. applies Y Y N ?
C.I.S.G. applies N Y N N
ICLAIC applies Y Y Y ?
Key
XX = both parties
X = only one party
Y = yes
N = no
? = result uncertain
1. Interplay between the ICLAIC and the U.C.C.: Scenario 1
In the first hypothetical scenario, both contracting parties
are signatories to the ICLAIC, but only one, the United States, is
a C.I.S.G. signatory. Scenario 1 assumes that a U.S. seller ("SI")
enters into a contract for the sale of goods with a non-U.S. buyer
("BI"), who is located in state X, a party to the ICLAIC, but not a
contracting state under the C.I.S.G. The parties choose U.S. law
to govern the contract, referring to the ICLAIC in the contract
clause. SI subsequently refuses to perform unless BI agrees to a
disclaimer of any warranty of fitness.3 97 B1 orally agrees to this
modification of the agreement.
Under Scenario 1, presumably, the ICLAIC would govern
the choice of the law of the contract, since SI and B1 are located
in different states that are parties to the ICLAIC, and have cho-
A seller's warranty whether express or implies extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who
is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an
individual to whom the warranty extends.
Id. Both Alternatives A and B exclude corporations as they are not natural persons. Id.
Alternative A is narrower in scope, because it requires familial privity (or guest status)
in order to recover from a breach. Id. Alternative B is broader in scope, because it
allows recovery by any potential user. Id. Alternative C includes corporations; however,
it limits the amount to be recovered, excluding damages to property damage. Id. Each
alternative includes language which limits the ability of the seller to limit warranties. Id.
396. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312 - 315 (providing seller's warranties).
397. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-315 (establishing "an implied warranty that goods shall be
fit for [a known] purpose" under contract for sale of goods).
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sen U.S. law to govern the. contract.398 It would appear, there-
fore, that because the United States is a contracting state of the
C.I.S.G, the C.I.S.G. would apply as part of U.S. law. The United
States, however, has submitted a declaration 399 refusing to ac-
cept the alternative, choice-of-law basis ofjurisdiction under the
C.I.S.G.40 Accordingly, the C.I.S.G. does not apply and, instead,
the U.S. law that governs under this contract is the U.C.C. As a
result, the oral disclaimer of the warranty of fitness is impermissi-
ble. 1 Even if the C.I.S.G. did apply to this contract, however,
the U.C.C. provision concerning disclaimer of warranties of fit-
ness would not necessarily be displaced by the C.I.S.G.4 °2
2. Interplay between the ICLAIC and the C.I.S.G.: Scenario 2
In the second scenario, both parties are signatories to the
C.I.S.G. and signatories to the ICLAIC. Scenario 2 assumes that
U.S. seller ("S2") enters into a contract for the sale of goods with
buyer ("B2"), located in state Y, an ICLAIC signatory. S2 and B2
choose U.S. law to govern the contract, referring to the ICLAIC
in a contract clause. The contract contains terms concerning
charges for late payments or other deviations from promised
performance on the part of B2 that arguably would be uncon-
scionable if included in a U.S. domestic contract.40 3
Under Scenario 2, presumably, the ICLAIC would govern
the choice of the law of the contract, since S2 and B2 are located
in different states that are parties to the Convention.40 4 Coinci-
dentally, the parties' choice of U.S. law would probably lead
them to the C.I.S.G., since it applies to international contracts
for the sale of goods.40 5 The ICLAIC, however, by its own terms,
does not invoke the application of the C.I.S.G., and so the con-
398. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 733.
399. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. declaration prevent-
ing non-signatories from invoking C.I.S.G. protection).
400. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing alternative basis for
C.I.S.G. jurisdiction).
401. U.C.C § 2-316(2) (requiring exclusion of warranty of fitness to be in writing
and conspicuous).
402. See UNIFORM LAW, supra note 8, at 258-59 (arguing that U.C.C. § 2-316(2) is
not "validity" provision excluded from scope of C.I.S.G. under Article 4(a)).
403. See, e.g., Perdue v. Crocker Natl. Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (1985) (holding that
price term may involve unconscionability).
404. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 733.
405. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. l(1)(a), 19 I.L.M. at 672.
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tract would, therefore, have to be analyzed independently under
the C.I.S.G. to determine whether it would apply. One require-
ment for application of the C.I.S.G. is that the parties' places of
business must be in different states, both of which are con-
tracting states under the C.I.S.G.4 06 In addition, the C.I.S.G. re-
quires that the locations of the parties' places of business be ex-
press either in the contract or from information disclosed by the
parties. °7
Assuming that the C.I.S.G. does in fact apply to the contract,
the question arises whether the contract terms concerning
charges can be challenged under the unconscionability provi-
sion of the U.C.C.40 Unconscionability is considered an issue of
"validity" of a contract provision, 40 9 and it is therefore not an
issue preempted by the C.I.S.G.4' 0 Thus, contract terms may be
challenged under the U.C.C., despite the applicability of the
C.I.S.G.
3. Interplay between the ICLAIC, the C.I.S.G., and U.C.C.:
Scenario 3
In the third scenario, the U.S. party ("$3") is a C.I.S.G. and
ICLAIC member and the other party ("B3") is operating in Ven-
ezuela, which is only an ICLAIC member. Scenario 3 assumes
that S3 enters into a requirements contract 1 with B3 for data
collection, compilation, and distribution services, and that the
contract does not include an explicit choice of law by the parties.
Under the contract, S3 is licensed to transmit data to B3 and to
distribute one hundred thousand to one hundred and fifty thou-
sand disks to Venezuelan clients. Finally, S3 is to provide com-
plete hardcopy of the data to B3's corporate headquarters in
Cuba,41 2 which is an O.A.S. member but not a signatory of the
406. Id. art. 1(1)(a), 19 I.L.M. 672.
407. Id. art. 1(2), 19 I.L.M. at 672.
408. U.C.C. § 2-302.
409. See UNIFORM LAw, supra note 8, at 259-60 (discussing continued application of
U.C.C. § 2-302 to contracts under C.I.S.G.).
410. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art 4(a), 19 I.L.M. at 673.
411. See, e.g., id. § 2-306 (defining requirements contract as "term which measures
the quantity [under a contract for sale of goods] by... the requirements of the buyer").
412. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANcrrIONS AND U.S. TRADE, 349-393 (1990
& 1994 Cum. Supp.) (discussing U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba). This aspect of
the hypothetical does not consider the legal implications for the transaction of the U.S.
embargo against Cuba. Id.
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ICLAIC. B3 is upgrading its telecommunications lines, which
will be only nominally operative for at least six months. S3
makes several frustrated attempts to transfer the data and there-
after provides only diskcopy to B3 and hardcopy to corporate
headquarters in Cuba. As a result, B3 stops making monthly pay-
ments.
Under Scenario 3, arguably the U.C.C. cannot apply, since a
preponderant part of the contract is a contract for services.4"'
The C.I.S.G. does not apply to service contracts and therefore
cannot apply to the "mixed" portion of this contract.4" 4 Further-
more, while the United States is a party to the C.I.S.G., Vene-
zuela is not, and the United States has reserved against applying
the C.I.S.G. to contracts involving a non-C.I.S.G. state.415
Even assuming the C.I.S.G. does apply to that severable part
of the contract that is predominately a sale of goods, under the
ICLAIC the law of the state where the contract has the closest
ties will govern.416 In determining which state has the closest ties
with the contract - the United States, Venezuela or Cuba -
the ICLAIC requires a court to account for every objective and
subjective element of the contract and to separate out the parts
of a contract that may have closer ties to different states, so that
the law of those states would apply respectively to the different
parts of the contract. Further, the courts take account of the
generally accepted commercial principles of international law in
the interests ofjustice and equity.4 17 As a result, it would be nec-
essary to examine the forum court's policy to determine which
abstract policy factors would be used to determine the applicable
law.4 1
8
413. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting U.C.C. limitation to sale of
goods).
414. See C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 3(2), 19 I.L.M. at 672 (limiting C.I.S.G. to
contracts where preponderant part is goods); see supra note 85 (discussing "mixed con-
tracts").
415. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. declaration prevent-
ing non-signatories from invoking C.I.S.G. protection).
416. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
417. Id. art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
418. See supra notes 382-84 and accompanying text (discussing concern that
ICLAIC, like Rome Convention, provides excessive discretion to forum court to deter-
mine public policy).
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4. Interplay between the ICLAIC, the C.I.S.G., and U.C.C.:
Scenario 4
In this final scenario, both parties are U.S. citizens. Scena-
rio 4 assumes that the U.S. seller ("S4") enters into a require-
ments contract4 19 that is silent as to the operative law with a U.S.
buyer ("B4") for retail goods. The goods are to be shipped by S4
to B4's stores in state Z, which is a party to the ICLAIC and the
C.I.S.G. The contract contains an exclusion of all S4's warranties
with respect to any consumer in state Z who purchases goods
from B4.
Under Scenario 4, the ICLAIC may apply even though S4
and B4 are both located in the United States, since, arguably,
state Z, a party to the ICLAIC, has objective ties to the contract
as the place of performance.420 Because the applicable law gov-
erning the contract is not explicitly chosen, the ICLAIC would
require that the contract be evaluated by the law of the state with
the closest ties to the transaction.42 a
If that state is the United States, the question arises whether
the C.I.S.G. applies to the contract.422 The Convention may not
apply since, unlike the ICLAIC,423 the C.I.S.G. only applies to
contracts between parties with places of business in different
states.424 If the C.I.S.G. does not apply to the contract, then the
U.C.C. will be the governing law, and the exclusion of third-party
beneficiaries from the contract warranties will be open to serious
question.425
However, if B4's stores in state Z have the closest relation-
419. See supra note 409 and accompanying text (discussing requirements con-
tracts).
420. The ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 733 (providing that contract is
"international" if it has "objective ties" to more than one state party). The fact that S4
and B4 are located in the same ICLAIC state party is not a bar to the application of the
convention. See id. art. 13, 33 I.L.M. at 736 (applying ICLAIC to contract between par-
ties in same state).
421. Id. art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
422. See C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 1(1)(a), 19 I.L.M. at 672 (governing scope of
application).
423. See supra note 418 and accompanying text (noting that ICLAIC may apply to
contracts between parties in same state). Cf supra note 224 and accompanying text
(discussing distinction between C.I.S.G. and ICLAIC with respect to "internationality"
of contract between parties located in same state).
424. C.I.S.G., supra note 7, art. 1(1), 19 I.L.M. at 733.
425. U.C.C. § 2-318 (exclusion of third-party beneficiaries from warranties prohib-
ited).
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ship to the contract and its performance, state Z may be consid-
ered B4's place of business,426 which would make the C.I.S.G.
applicable. If the C.I.S.G. does apply, the question arises
whether the pertinent U.C.C. provisions concerning contract
warranties would still apply, as a validity issue outside the scope
of the U.C.C.412  Arguably the U.C.C. provisions concerning war-
ranties would not be considered a "validity" issue under the
C.I.S.G.4 2s Accordingly, the corresponding C.I.S.G. provisions
concerning conformity of goods would be the applicable law.42 9
D. The Potential Disadvantages of the ICLAIC Outweigh its
Intended Benefits
The United States should refuse to adopt the ICLAIC as a
choice-of-law convention because the burdens imposed by the
ratification of the ICLAIC outweigh all advantages. Although
the United States may support efforts by the O.A.S. community
to harmonize, develop, and codify private international law, re-
fusing to adopt the ICLAIC is in the best interests of the United
States. The foregoing scenarios suggest a number of interpretive
issues that will lead to uncertainty under the ICLAIC should it be
adopted by the United States. The ICLAIC also defers to the
forum with respect to the determination of the commercial law
and practices that are to be applied in interpreting the parties
contractual rights.4"' These determinations are likely to occur
under confusing and unpredictable circumstances, as illustrated
by the foregoing scenarios.
CONCLUSION
The ICLAIC is a faulty document, and the United States
should not adopt it. The ICLAIC is a convention - originally
intended to facilitate international contracts - that in fact will
inject a greater degree of uncertainty and unpredictability in
426. C.I.S.G., supra note 7, art. 10(a), 19 I.L.M. at 674; see UNIFORM LAW, supra
note 8, at 78-80 (discussing the effect of Article 10(a)).
427. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 4(a) 19 I.L.M. at 673 (providing that C.I.S.G. does
not govern issues of validity of contract or its provisions).
428. See UNIFORM LAW, supra note 8, at 257-59 (discussing U.C.C. warranties and
the "validity" issue).
429. C.I.S.G., supra note 17, art. 35, 19 I.L.M. at 679. See UNIFORM LAw, supra note
8, at 250-56 (discussing Article 35).
430. ICLAIC, supra note 2, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 735.
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such contracts. It fails to provide adequate guidance to forum
courts to determine the intention of the parties and instead al-
lows broad discretion in determining applicable law. Without
restraints provided by a narrow definition of the applicable law,
judges are left to their complete and unfettered discretion. For
all practical purposes, judges will probably rely on methods or
standards with which they are familiar - the standards of their
jurisdiction.4"' Adoption of the ICLAIC will result in less uni-
formity by imposing numerous standards rather than harmoniz-
ing choice-of-law provisions through creation of a single stan-
dard. In order to avoid such systematic destruction of the goals
sought by the ICLAIC's drafters, the United States should reject
the document in its present form.
431. See Paradigm, supra note 5, 11-12 (discussing critical attitude towards Rome
Convention which is bound to influence ajudge when interpreting its provisions).
The European Community has attempted to rectify the situation of ma-
nipulation with its discretionary provisions through a series of protocols. The
stated purpose of these combined protocols is eventually to confer on the Eu-
ropean Court ofJustice [E.C.J.] the power to interpret the Rome Convention.
The Protocols, however, may not necessarily solve the jurisdictional prob-
lem [because] the Convention's wording leaves the construction of most of its
key concepts to the discretion of the (national) courts: 'effect may be given,'
Imore closely connected,' 'deprives of protection,' etc.... Even assuming that
the Protocols will solve the jurisdictional dilemma, there are experts who as-
sert that some countries, such as the United Kingdom, will nonetheless refuse
to submit to such provisions and will continue to refer interpretation to their
own courts.
Ifjurisdiction is eventually conferred on the E.C.J., there is no guarantee
that it would interpret the Convention according to the drafters' intentions;
indeed, there is persuasive evidence to the contrary.
Id. at 192.
